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Seco Judicial District Court - Latah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2015-0001389 Current Judge: John C. Judge 
Defendant: Pettit, Ivan Drake 
User: RANAE 
State of Idaho vs. Ivan Drake Pettit 
Date Code User Judge 
5/20/2015 NEWI IMPORT New Case Filed, Citation Import John C. Judge 
PROS RANAE Prosecutor assigned William W. Thompson Jr. John C. Judge 
PLEA MAUREEN A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (I18-8004(1)(a) John C. Judge 
{M}{2} Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second 
Offenses)) 
HRSC MAUREEN Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference John C. Judge 
06/02/2015 09:30 AM) 
ARRN MAUREEN Arraignment I First Appearance John C. Judge 
BSET MAUREEN BOND SET: at 1,000.00 John C. Judge 
COMM MAUREEN Commitment - Held To Answer-conditons John C. Judge 
imposed by the court 
BNDS CHARLOTTE Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 1000.00) John C. Judge 
HRSC MAUREEN Hearing Scheduled (Attention 09/21/2015 05:00 John C. Judge 
PM) speedy trial issue-arraigned on 5-20-15 
INDG CHARLOTTE lndigency Statement John C. Judge 
ALSN RANAE Administrative License Suspension Notice And John C. Judge 
Temporary Permit 
5/21/2015 ORPD CHARLOTTE Defendant: Pettit, Ivan D Order Appointing Public John C. Judge 
Defender Public defender Latah County Pub. 
Defender-McCormick, Deborah 
CHARLOTTE Order Appointing Public Defender John C. Judge 
RQDS JAN Request For Discovery John C. Judge 
6/2/2015 CONT JAN Continued (Pretrial Conference 06/23/2015 John C. Judge 
09:30 AM) 
6/5/2015 RSRD BETH Response To Request For Discovery John C. Judge 
6/23/2015 CONT JAN Continued (Pretrial Conference 07/21/2015 John C. Judge 
09:30 AM) 
7/21/2015 HRHD RANAE Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled John C. Judge 
on 07/21/2015 09:30 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC RANAE Hearing Scheduled (Jury Pre-Trial Conf. and John C. Judge 
Motions 09/28/2015 03:30 PM) 
HRSC RANAE Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/02/2015 08:30 John C. Judge 
AM) 
CONT RANAE Hearing result for Attention scheduled on John C. Judge 
09/21/2015 05:00 PM: Continued speedy trial 
issue-arraigned on 5-20-15 
HRSC RANAE Hearing Scheduled (Attention 10/20/2015 05:00 John C. Judge 
PM) Speedy Trial Issues - Arraigned 5/20/15 
RANAE Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
ORDR RANAE Pre-Trial Scheduling Order John C. Judge 
CONT RANAE Continued (Jury Trial 10/16/2015 08:30 AM) John C. Judge 
RANAE Amended Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
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Date: 6/24/2016 Secc. Judicial District Court - Latah County User: RANAE 
Time: 03:47 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 3 Case: CR-2015-0001389 Current Judge: John C. Judge 
Defendant: Pettit, Ivan Drake 
State of Idaho vs. Ivan Drake Pettit 
Date Code User Judge 
7/22/2015 HRSC RANAE Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress John C. Judge 
09/17/2015 03:30 PM) 
RANAE Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
7/23/2015 RODA JAN Request For Discovery Disclosure; Alibi Demand John C. Judge 
8/20/2015 CONT MAGGIE Hearing result for Jury Pre-Trial Conf. and John C. Judge 
Motions scheduled on 09/28/2015 03:30 PM: 
Continued 
HRSC MAGGIE Hearing Scheduled (Jury Pre-Trial Conf. and John C. Judge 
Motions 09/29/2015 03:30 PM) 
MAGGIE Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
9/8/2015 CONT JAN Continued (Motion to Suppress 10/15/2015 John C. Judge 
03:30 PM) 
JAN Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
MOSP JAN Motion To Suppress John C. Judge 
9/11/2015 SUBR BETH Subpoena Returned - Clint Baldwin John C. Judge 
MOTN RANAE Motion to Vacate Jury Pre-Trial Conference and John C. Judge 
to Continue Jury Trial 
CONT JAN Continued (Jury Pre-Trial Conf. and Motions John C. Judge 
10/19/2015 04:00 PM) 
CONT JAN Continued (Jury Trial 10/23/2015 08:30 AM) John C. Judge 
JAN Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
9/22/2015 RSPN CHARLOTTE Response To Defendant's Motion To Suppress John C. Judge 
Evidence 
10/6/2015 SUPR JAN Supplemental Response To Request For John C. Judge 
Discovery 
10/9/2015 REPL JAN REPLY TO ST ATES RESPONSE John C. Judge 
10/15/2015 INHD MAUREEN Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled John C. Judge 
on 10/15/2015 03:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
CTMN MAUREEN Court Minutes John C. Judge 
10/16/2015 ORDR JAN ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS John C. Judge 
10/19/2015 TRAN TERRY Partial Transcript of Suppression Hearing John C. Judge 
HRHD MAGGIE Hearing result for Jury Pre-Trial Conf. and John C. Judge 
Motions scheduled on 10/19/2015 04:00 PM: 
Hearing Held 
10/21/2015 NOTA RANAE NOTICE OF APPEAL John C. Judge 
APDC MAGGIE Appeal Filed In District Court John C. Judge 
CHJG MAGGIE Change Assigned Judge John R. Stegner 
10/22/2015 HRVC CHARLOTTE Hearing result for Attention scheduled on John C. Judge 
10/20/2015 05:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Speedy 
Trial Issues - Arraigned 5/20/15 
HRVC CHARLOTTE Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on John C. Judge 
10/23/2015 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 000009 
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Secc. "Judicial District Court - Latah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2015-0001389 Current Judge: John C. Judge 
Defendant: Pettit, Ivan Drake 
User: RANAE 
State of Idaho vs. Ivan Drake Pettit 
Date Code User Judge 
11/2/2015 TRAN TERRY Transcript of Suppression Hearing John R. Stegner 
NOTC TERRY Notice of Lodging of Transcript John R. Stegner 
11/23/2015 MISC TERRY Transcript settled John R. Stegner 
11/30/2015 HRSC TERRY Hearing Scheduled (Appellate Argument John R. Stegner 
02/29/2016 09:30 AM) 
12/2/2015 ORDR TERRY Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling John R. Stegner 
Oral Argument 
12/8/2015 STIP BETH Stipulation for Revised Briefing Schedule and For John R. Stegner 
Rescheduling Oral Argument 
12/10/2015 ORDR TERRY Order Denying Parties' Stipulation for Revised John R. Stegner 
Briefing Schedule 
12/28/2015 BREF BETH Appellant's Brief John R. Stegner 
1/19/2016 NOTC CHARLOTTE Notice of Association of Counsel John R. Stegner 
1/25/2016 BREF RANAE Respondent's Brief John R. Stegner 
2/16/2016 BREF BETH Appellant's Reply Brief John R. Stegner 
2/29/2016 DCHH TERRY Hearing result for Appellate Argument scheduled John R. Stegner 
on 02/29/2016 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 37 pages 
CTMN TERRY Hearing result for Appellate Argument scheduled John R. Stegner 
on 02/29/2016 09:30 AM: Court Minutes 
4/1/2016 OPIN TERRY Appellate Opinion John R. Stegner 
4/19/2016 HRSC JAN Hearing Scheduled (Status 04/25/2016 04:00 John C. Judge 
PM) Status of appeal to SC 
JAN Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
4/25/2016 REMT BETH Remittitur John R. Stegner 
PHRM BETH Remanded For Preliminary Hearing John R. Stegner 
RMAN BETH Remanded John R. Stegner 
CHJG BETH Change Assigned Judge John C. Judge 
CONT JAN Continued (Status 05/18/2016 02:30 PM) Status John C. Judge 
of appeal to SC 
JAN Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
5/6/2016 NOTA RANAE NOTICE OF APPEAL John C. Judge 
5/18/2016 CTMN MAUREEN Court Minutes John C. Judge 
5/27/2016 ORDR RANAE Order to Consolidate Appeal Nos. 44198 and John C. Judge 
44199 for All Purposes 
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Sec Judicial District Court - Latah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2015-0001408 Current Judge: John C. Judge 
Defendant: Pettit, Ivan Drake 
User: RANAE 
State of Idaho vs. Ivan Drake Pettit 
Date 
5/21/2015 
6/2/2015 
6/5/2015 
6/23/2015 
7/21/2015 
7/23/2015 
8/20/2015 
9/8/2015 
9/9/2015 
9/11/2015 
Code 
NEWI 
PROS 
ORPD 
HRSC 
RQDS 
CONT 
HRSC 
RSRD 
CONT 
HRHD 
CONT 
HRSC 
HRSC 
HRSC 
ORDR 
CONT 
RODA 
CONT 
MOSP 
HRSC 
MOTN 
User Judge 
IMPORT New Case Filed, Citation Import John C. Judge 
CHARLOTTE Prosecutor assigned William W. Thompson Jr. John C. Judge 
CHARLOTTE Defendant: Pettit, Ivan D Order Appointing Public John C. Judge 
Defender Public defender Latah County Pub. 
Defender-McCormick, Deborah 
CHARLOTTE Order Appointing Public Defender 
CHARLOTTE Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
06/02/2015 09:30 AM) 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
JAN 
JAN 
JAN 
BETH 
JAN 
RANAE 
RANAE 
RANAE 
RANAE 
RANAE 
RANAE 
RANAE 
RANAE 
RANAE 
JAN 
MAGGIE 
MAGGIE 
JAN 
JAN 
JAN 
RANAE 
Request For Discovery 
Continued (Pretrial Conference 06/23/2015 
09:30 AM) 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Attention 09/21/2015 05:00 John C. Judge 
PM) SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE-SCHEDULE JURY 
TRIAL 
Response To Request For Discovery 
Continued (Pretrial Conference 07/21/2015 
09:30 AM) 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled John C. Judge 
on 07/21/2015 09:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Attention scheduled on 
09/21/2015 05:00 PM: Continued SPEEDY 
TRIAL ISSUE-SCHEDULE JURY TRIAL 
John C. Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Attention 10/20/2015 05:00 John C. Judge 
PM) Speedy Trial Issues - Arm. 5/20/15 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Pre-Trial Cont. and 
Motions 09/28/2015 03:30 PM) 
John C. Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/02/2015 08:30 John C. Judge 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Pre-Trial Scheduling Order 
Continued (Jury Trial 10/16/2015 08:30 AM) 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
Request For Discovery Disclosure; Alibi Demand John C. Judge 
Continued (Jury Pre-Trial Conf. and Motions 
09/29/2015 03:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
Motion To Suppress John C. Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress John C. Judge 
10/15/2015 03:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
Motion to Vacate Jury Pre-Trial Conference and John C. Judge 
to Continue Jury Trial 
000011 
Date: 6/24/2016 Sec, J Judicial District Court - Latah County User: RANAE 
Time: 03:47 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 3 Case: CR-2015-0001408 Current Judge: John C. Judge 
Defendant: Pettit, Ivan Drake 
State of Idaho vs. Ivan Drake Pettit 
Date Code User Judge 
9/11/2015 CONT JAN Continued (Jury Trial 10/23/2015 08:30 AM) John C. Judge 
CONT JAN Continued (Jury Pre-Trial Conf. and Motions John C. Judge 
10/19/2015 04:00 PM) 
JAN Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
9/22/2015 RSPN CHARLOTTE Response To Defendant's Motion To Suppress John C. Judge 
Evidence 
10/6/2015 SUPR JAN Supplemental Response To Request For John C. Judge 
Discovery 
10/9/2015 REPL JAN REPLY TO ST ATES RESPONSE John C. Judge 
10/15/2015 INHD MAUREEN Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled John C. Judge 
on 10/15/2015 03:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
CTMN MAUREEN Court Minutes John C. Judge 
10/16/2015 ORDR JAN ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS John C. Judge 
10/19/2015 HRHD MAGGIE Hearing result for Jury Pre-Trial Conf. and John C. Judge 
Motions scheduled on 10/19/2015 04:00 PM: 
Hearing Held 
10/21/2015 NOTA RANAE NOTICE OF APPEAL John C. Judge 
APDC MAGGIE Appeal Filed In District Court John C. Judge 
CHJG MAGGIE Change Assigned Judge John R. Stegner 
10/22/2015 HRVC CHARLOTTE Hearing result for Attention scheduled on John C. Judge 
10/20/2015 05:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Speedy 
Trial Issues - Arm. 5/20/15 
HRVC CHARLOTTE Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on John C. Judge 
10/23/2015 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
11/2/2015 NOTC TERRY Notice of Lodging of Transcript John R. Stegner 
TRAN TERRY Transcript of Suppression Hearing John R. Stegner 
11/23/2015 MISC TERRY Transcript settled John R. Stegner 
12/2/2015 ORDR TERRY Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling John R. Stegner 
Oral Argument 
12/8/2015 STIP BETH Stipulation For Revised Briefing Schedule and for John R. Stegner 
Rescheduling Oral Argument 
12/10/2015 ORDR TERRY Order Denying Parties' Stipulation for Revised John R. Stegner 
Briefing Schedule 
12/28/2015 BREF BETH Appellant's Brief John R. Stegner 
1/25/2016 BREF RANAE Respondent's Brief John R. Stegner 
2/16/2016 BREF BETH Appellant's Reply Brief John R. Stegner 
HRSC BETH Hearing Scheduled (Appellate Argument John R. Stegner 
02/29/2016 09:30 AM) 
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Page 3 of·3 
Sec~ _J Judicial District Court - Latah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2015-0001408 Current Judge: John C. Judge 
Defendant: Pettit, Ivan Drake 
User: RANAE 
State of Idaho vs. Ivan Drake Pettit 
Date 
2/29/2016 
4/1/2016 
4/19/2016 
4/25/2016 
5/6/2016 
5/18/2016 
5/27/2016 
Code 
DCHH 
CTMN 
OPIN 
HRSC 
REMT 
PHRM 
RMAN 
. CHJG 
CONT 
NOTA 
CTMN 
ORDR 
User 
TERRY 
TERRY 
TERRY 
JAN 
JAN 
BETH 
BETH 
BETH 
BETH 
JAN 
JAN 
RANAE 
MAUREEN 
RANAE 
Judge 
Hearing result for Appellate Argument scheduled John R. Stegner 
on 02/29/2016 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 37 pages 
Hearing result for Appellate Argument scheduled John R. Stegner 
on 02/29/2016 09:30 AM: Court Minutes 
Appellate Opinion 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 04/25/2016 04:00 
PM) Status of appeal to SC 
Notice Of Hearing 
Remittitur 
Remanded For Preliminary Hearing 
John R. Stegner 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
Remanded John R. Stegner 
Change Assigned Judge John C. Judge 
Continued (Status 05/18/2016 02:30 PM) Status John C. Judge 
of appeal to SC 
Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL John C. Judge 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on John C. Judge 
05/18/2016 02:30 PM: Court Minutes Status of 
appeal to SC 
Order to Consolidate Appeal Nos. 44198 and John C. Judge 
44199 for All Purposes 
000013 
r-0"~------- --------
1 SIGNATURE Idaho State Police - U1 .01 m Citation 
In the court designated below the undersigned certifies that he/she has 1 just and reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that on: 
..... 
· Citation #: 
j ISP0354125 
toate/Time: 05/20/2015 03:36 AM DR#: L 15000585 
) IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 2ND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO 
VIOLATOR 
Last Name: PETTIT 
First Name: IV AN 
Hm. Address: 3621 HWY 95 S 
Cty, St, Zip: MOSCOW, ID 8384300000 
{ 
Ml:D 
DOB
Phone: 
Height: 601 Weight: 240 Sex: M Eyes: GRN Hair: BRO 
DL# DLState:ID Lie. Expires:2017 
Class:D 
Hazmat:N GVWR 26001+:N 
Commercial vehicle driven by this driver: N 
Bus. Name: 
Bus. Addr: 
Bus. Phone: 
I REGISTRATION 
Yr. Veh:1995 Veh. Lie #: DNF303 
Make:TOYT Model:COR 
Co!or: BLK Style: 4D 
VIN:
Carrier US DOT #: 
I LOCATION 
16+ Persons: N 
State:AK 
Upon a Public Street or Highway or Other Location Namely: 
PARKING LOT OF THE CONOCO ON S. MAIN NEAR TAYLOR 
AVE IN MOSCOW 
! VIOLATIONS 
Did commit the following Offense(s), In violation of State Statute, 
Infraction Citation: N Misdemeanor Citation: Y 
Posted Speed: Observed Speed: Accident: N 
Date/Time: 05/20/2015 02:23 AM 
Violation #1: 118-8004(1 )(a} {M}{2} 
DRIViNG UNDER THE INFLUENCE (2ND OFF. W/IN 10 YRS); 
BRAC :128/.119; PR CONV IN ID 1/6/15 
Violation #2: 
-------------------------
Violation #3: 
Violation #4: 
I COURT INFORMATION 
LATAH COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT 
522 SOUTH ADAMS RM 119 
I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on [x}05/20/2015 
Signature of Officer: ________________ _ 
Officer Name: C BALDWIN 
Agency Name:IDAHO STATE POLICE 
Witness: 
Address: 
Department: I OFFICER NOTES 
READ CAREFULLY 
This is a MISDEMEANOR charge in which: 
Officer ID:3113 
Serial#: 
NOTE: If you fail to appear within the time allowed for your 
appearance, another charge of failure to appear may be filed 
and a warrant may be issued for your arrest. 
1. You may be represented by a lawyer, which will be at your 
expense unless the judge finds you are indigent. 
2. You are entitled to a trial by jury if requested by you. 
3. PLEA OF NOT GUILTY: You may plead not guilty to the 
charge by appearing before the clerk of the court or the 
judge, within the time allowed for your appearance, at which 
time you will be given a trial date. 
4. PLEA OF GUil TY: You may plead guilty to the charge by 
going to the clerk of the court, within the time allowed for your 
appearance, at which time you will be told if you can pay a 
fixed fine or \Vhether it will be necessary for you to appear 
before the judge; 
OR 
You may have your fine determined by a judge at a time 
arranged with the clerk of the court, within the time allowed 
for your appearance. 
5. If you plead guilty, you may still give an explanation to the 
judge. 
6. You may call the clerk of the court to determine if you can 
sign a plea of guilty and pay the fine and costs by mail or over 
the Internet by going to: http://courtpay.idaho.gov 
I plead guilty to the charges. 
Defendant (it authorized by clerk of magistrate court) 
MAIL TO: 
LATAH COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT 
PO BOX8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843-0568 
MOSCOW, ID 83843-0568 
(208) 883-2255 
Fine #1: MUST APPEAR 
Fine #2: 
Court Date: 05/20/2015 
Court Time: 08:30 AM 
Fine #3: 
Fine #4: 
000014 
IT!J 3814 (Rev. 04-14) • 
Supply # 019680909 
Issued To: 
D ..J_.1 · 1 
-:.elf-:1-r:--
Last Name 
fYJosc~> -
City 
Not of Suspension for Failure of .antiary Testing 
(Advisory for Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code) DR# LI 5oaJ.S:~S1 
I L 
I ~- ( ,?-· 
Middle Date of Bi 
Mailing Address Driver's License Number State Li se lass 
:rb 
· · State Zip· < 
:cs f.&A"sejffi. 4' / zs:::apecaling CM>/? O Yes OJ No 
Citation # ' : . . • I . Trar1seorting Hazm~t·(J}.\ ~~ :_ ~ ~o 
r have reasonabk0grounds to believe that you ,were driving or .were in actuabph~si~;l .contro~1T . i,11 v6hi'cle1 ~hil~':lfudii'th6 ' . 
influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances: You are required by law to take a'nl!&/rnnnore eVideo~est(s)·to-. · 
determine the .concentration of akohol or the presence of drugs or othe_r intox~ 1g su s nces in your body. Aftyr: submitting to 
the test( s) you may, when practical, at your o~n expense, have additionaltest( s) made by a person of your own choosing. You do 
not have the right to talk to a lawyer before taking any evidentiary test(s) to determine the alcohol concentration or pr~sence of 
drugs or other int?xicating substances in your body. 
2. ff you refuse to t~ke or complete any of the.offetedtestgptirsuant to Section 18-8002, Idaho Code: 
A. You are subject to a civil penalty oftwohund~~d fifty do,liars($250). . . -·· - . . . . . . . _··-• ... . .· 
B. You have the tight to submit a written request within seven (7) days to the Magistrate Court of la f :L, • · County for a 
.heari11g to.show cause why you -refused to.submit to o_r failed to complete and pass evidentiary testmg and why YQllr. dri_ver's 
licens~ should not be suspended. 
C. If you do not request a hearing or do not prevail at the hearing, the court will sustain the civil penalty and your license wilLbe 
suspended with no driving privileges for one (I). yearifthis is your first refusal; and lwo (2) years if this is your second refusal 
· within ten (10) years (unless you meet the provisions of paragraph 4 below.)· 
3. If you take arid fail the evidentiary test(s) pursuant toSectiorr I 8~8002A, Idaho Code: 
.',··-.,,,:':,,,;:,,~}.',:<:: '.o ,:; ... ·· ': · •••., •-~·•-1·.· ·· .,-.!~·-,,'.,.·:'·' ···:~·,. ,, ...• ·"' •,:: :·!. .., ·., .. '.,.,.·,::',.,:,,:··,, 
A. Iw1Ir serve you withtlus NOTICE OF SUSPENSION that becomes effective thirty (30) dll.ys from die Date Qf'Serviceon this 
notice suspending your driver's license or driving privileges. If this is your first failure of an evident1ary ttist with.in Hie lastfive 
(5) years, your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for ninety (W) days with;~l:>s~lutely;,JJ()-4I:iyJgg1prjyi!y_ges . 
of any ,kjnd .during t~~; fi~~!J!Ji!:ty-(3Q): ~~YS.:2.Y.2}:1citll_~Y.:f~Cl1f ~~t .1-:estricted .non:.commerc"faf driving privlleges]:or-ffierr~maining· -· ..... 
·-· sixtyj((i_Q}9-.ay$_of t_he,sm,p~risicm; R,~i;tfi¢taj19rivmg;pr~vi1~g~s wiltnot_i~,Il9"w yoll_ ~o .Qperate a commercial!motor vehicle.~Jf this 
.· • -is notyour:frrst:failure-ofaii e'videntiaty.testwithin1 the ifasgfive (5) years;;;your 'driver's license odiriving privilegesiwill be 1 ·• . 
su'spendetl fot!t>ne·"(-1) year with:no ·dfivingpiivileges'drany'kind 'duririg'thil.t period '(unless-you meet the' provisions 5f / .,, 
paragraph 4 below.) ·; ,_, 1 ,. ' • '..,,, ' •. • ,.. "·, ::' 
· • -B, Yoi.f have the fighftt:>'an adlliin'istrative· hearing ori the•suspensioh ·before the Idaho'Trarisportation Depattinentto snow;catise 
• , wliy '¼a·fari~ci1th~:e~dent!ary1festcdntf wny yoiJ¥\iriver"s' lic~iise i;hoµld'_rtot be suspended, The requestfuusf'He nilid~1 in\yntmg 
.. anli1 rectf VJd tb}' th'h dep:irtmeht' WithHt"seviay1'5 ta1er\'cia:fdayii frbhl'tHWDlte' ot $e'r\ri~e on .tnis'NdTiCE OF ~USPENSltJN.'H. 
You also.have the right to judicial review ofthe Hearing Officer's dJcisili\!{·:: ' :~'. · . : · -.. · · .. ':r:,n1r:·, c:1" 1'' n;,c . 
, , , , , :."'1H;l/\1)•i .tf;I::£(-:·_. 
4. · If.you are adl;tJ.itted-to a;problem:solvfog com:t,prpgram and,hav~ sezy,ed at least.forty'-five -(45) days :of.an absolute suspells5ton?of,, .· 
driving _privileges; you may be elig~ble forca·restricted:pemiit.fonthe;ptirpose.ofig~tting:to and 'froth ;work, schoql,,or,an.akohoH 
treaq:ti~nfprw~furiy\. . . . . 
Departmental Report# L15000585 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF11'R:E1 2J ,,, , 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
COURT CASE NUMBER 
-------
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
PETTIT, Ivan Drake 
DOB:
SSN/DL:
State: Ida
State of Idaho, 
County of LAT AH 
OF ARREST AND/OR REFUSAL TO TAKE TEST 
I, Sergeant Clint A. Baldwin the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says 
that: 
1. I am a peace officer employed by the Idaho State Police. 
2. The defendant was arrested on May 20, 2015 at 0320 hours for the crime of driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances (2nd offense) 
pursuant to Idaho code section 18-8005(4). Second or more DUI offense in the last ten years? 
Yes - Misdemeanor 
Other Offenses: Driving Without Privileges 
3. Location of Occurrence: In the parking lot of the Conoco Station on S. Main St near 
Taylor Ave, in Moscow, Latah County 
4. Identified the defendant as: PETTIT, Ivan Drake by: Driver's License 
5. Actual physical control established by: Observation By Affiant 
6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because 
of the following facts: 
(NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed 
and what you learned from someone else, identifying that person): 
'i• 0 (;, C: 
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Departmental Report# L15000585 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST: 
On May 20, 2015, at approximately 0223 hours, I, Sergeant Clint A. Baldwin of the Idaho 
State Police, stopped a black Toyota Corolla (Alaska registration DNF303) in the parking 
lot of the Conoco Station on S. Main St near Taylor Ave, in Moscow, Latah County, Idaho. 
I had witnessed the driver of the Toyota fail to signal a right turn from the S. Main couplet 
onto S. Main St. I could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the Toyota. I 
noticed the driver's eyes were glassy in appearance, and when he spoke his speech was slow 
and slightly slurred. The driver identified himself as Ivan Drake PETTIT (DOB 
with his Idaho driver's license. PETTIT admitted to consuming alcohol prior 
to driving. After running a driver's check, I asked PETTIT to exit the Toyota to perform 
the standardized field sobriety evaluations. PETTIT performed and met the decision 
points on each of the three evaluations administered (see attached copy of the Influence 
Report form). After listening to the ALS advisory and after the mandatory fifteen minute 
waiting period, PETTIT provided two breath samples on the Lifeloc FC20; the results were 
.126/.119. I arrested PETTIT for DUI and transported him to the Latah County Jail where 
he was booked in for driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other 
intoxicating substances (2nd offense) pursuant to Idaho code section 18-8005(4). PETTIT 
had a prior DUI conviction (withheld judgment) in Idaho on 01/06/2015. PETTIT was also 
cited for Driving Without Privileges as he was suspended in Idaho from 01/06/2015 until 
04/06/2015 for DUI, and had failed to reenstate his driving privileges. 
Video: Arbitrator 
D.U. I. NOTES Sobriety Tests-Meets Decision Points? 
Odor of alcoholic beverage: Yes 
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage: Yes 
Slurred speech: Yes 
Impaired memory: Yes 
Glassy/bloodshot eyes: Yes 
Other: 
Gaze Nystagmus: Yes 
Walk & Tum: Yes 
One Leg Stand: Yes 
Crash Involved: No Injury: No 
Drugs Suspected: No Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed: No 
Reason Drugs are Suspected: 
Prior to being offered the test, the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of 
refusal and failure of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code. 
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The 
test(s) was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004 (4), Idaho Code, and 
the standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement. 
BAC: .126/.119 Breath Instrument Type: Lifeloc FC20 Serial# 90205675 
Name of person administering breath test: Clint A. Baldwin 
Date Certification Expires: 10/03/2015 
Videotape # Arbitrator 
Page 2 of 3 
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I, Sergeant Clint A. Baldwin, the undersigned declare and state: 
"I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that 
the information contained in this document and attached reports and documents 
that may be included herein is true and correct to the best of my information and 
belief." 
Dated: ~/zo(zd i:>- Signed: 5J+. t:J?;fi0£L~ 
ORDER 
_ Based upon the above Affidavit, the Court hereby finds that there is Probable 
Cause to believe that a crime-:-o~~ _htt, been committed, and that the 
Defendant committed said crime or crimtts:'-'t 
Dated this E day of .<!1./'--c~ 
~___, 
, 201_), at :f:o.r ~urs. 
Page 3 of 3 000018 
Idaho State Police 
INFLUENCE REPORT 
Defendant's Name ___,_~_e=-..,_-r_
1
->-<~~'-·-=t;-'---. -+)----"--:_C------"\/i-~_· __ ·})=--·-· ______ DOB 
PRE-TEST 
~™-l~~--No,,,_-,-,. ,.¥.,~l~l;l1:1J-.'f8-~ .. Js.l.!'J,°. ____ ._"_, ... Re!:':1~:.2,~~...kJ~..-~~~~'1¥.l:',.r;;:;~.;;:-1-.::r·,···-,,-t 
-~ ;;·~.~""4'l.~~9fuELl;!;Q:iQ§,fl!~'J26lE§..'!§~~~~f~&~~; 
Eyes tracking equally Yes [ ] No 
HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS ADDITIONAL SOBRIETY TESTS 
EYES 
L R KJ K] Eye does not pursue smoothly 
'['g1 l).?J Distinct Nystagmus at max. deviation 
(X] ~ Nystagmus onset before 45 degrees 
[ (b I TOTAL 
VERTICAL NYSTAGMUS OYes (231 No 
PUPIL SIZE 5t?vP"1_€ ~- CONSTRICTED [ ] NORMAL f'><] DILATED [ ] 
WALK AND TURN D Cannot keep balance during instructions 0 1 
NY STAG MUS 
2 3 4 
D Starts too soon 
JxJ. Stops too soon 
fil Misses heel to toe 
[.81 Steps off line 
/~ Raises arms 
D Wrong number of steps 
D Improper turn 
D Cannot do test 
c$ Total 
ONE LEG STAND 
l:3l Sways 
~ Raises arms 
D Hops 
D Puts foot down 
D Cannot do test 
:ZJ Total 
Audio Tape 
0 1--+----1---.1--
1 l----+----+---1-
2 
1--.1---1---
W AL K 3 1---1----
AND 4 1----1-
TURN 5 
6 
7 
8== 
OBSERVATIONS .s I c,N + 
Eye Colorbr""- Eye C~nditio5l0t~_j Speech5/y"'--ff'j S/~d 
Breath od 0--C O ..p ~ C-lt. l Cutt D // C ~0Vc;_j 'E 
Foot Wear-knh L5 stioe S Ground Surface $ ,'Vl oO 1-z. 
D 
I e \le« I ) -e-ve+-._, cl rj Ct/7\.Gre-t-e__ 
CHEMICAL TEST 
tszJ.. Breath 
c:=J Other 
c=J Blood 
Test Result ~ .. / 2. {p It/ ] 
Refused test, Why? _______________ _ 
y G . 
Video Tape 6) N /} 32 7 /J ;/ 
OfficeCs Signature ">j±, c~ Q_~----- Date --=-S-__,__/1_2-,--0__,_/_!_~--
EH 07 05-01 REV.1/07 
000019 
' 
,_ 
\_ ~":::::,- -::-:-::, 
l_nstrument Operations log Instrument Seri-al !\lumber: .90205675" LE#61461 
Agency: IDAHO S1".t-.TE POLICE 
: This log should.contain aU of the evidentiary testing results for the instrument indicated by the serial number listed above. 
Date . Time Subject's Name .. Test Results Operator's Name Comments 
~?!&-l1s-.· DS'ID ... c) 8' l!lil.rn1.--t-'Al:,, P.V.. 'Jo,c1 ,1X70 .. c.·1<.0-.. ld--..:) ,~ 0+>1-1. ('-\@O~ 'R.:r+~ /()C, / 
c:-/&'./2 '-:J - D~ [ ~'$ · "'20- Mem+h Iv.~' \J, , I Ci<~.> , f 0 l C:...., 'R 0i.Jd;,-J/'Y\. l t--f-.bf, I t..f { D -S 1 ~~ 1f::- (/ I ! 
S-Jilf:lis- 0/o·?r' Afo+,·u'k,' -~-lrfl.d,)tlS~f;Jl-\ .J.71.;1,J :r.,;.,uf: .::t'it.S'L~ CI ·Ra .... /,.)_,,_')/\,,__ 'b&\ . .:C (r·~ L.IS-ooo c;-s-~ \ 
C, 
C"l 
0 
0 
0 
( ;/1 '1): 0 I l 0 . ~ / ~~\ ;\o l i-a.~ro, ila_slt ~)'It\ • 7-0-~ ::t'\5•ts Ar ff8" C '' :rs a. l_~':~"h. '1)[/l ~ ( r db ) I~~ O(Z)f)_ s_s-£)_ " ~~-
.:. +./2',.., 03 '+~3 ~ D'K: .P-. t1, C-~'l e00 . , 07"7 • 015 C , T?~ /,It..:. 1,~ _ L o-t--.1£. l~~o 3 'l<D+ ·:ti: 65 ::, 0 o~ 7. 
s1/s'.-/1c:, {) 2-7> ·1 'b., .<A i•'-koi'\ Q O )•, c~.IJ V .. I O{o • I 0(1) {_;' '/<..c,)ri,;,0 ,\-i. 'hvt..:r: .( c~) _ _;(C::C"::t?C).::;:) 3-9 \ 
~t:rli'~~03.s-?' -,08' PV,1 t-lu_:1c·,k:_ I d)7Y- ,D73 c,·g,,\/J..t-JillL- lerf,/;/;. IL\-~D'3. 13°-t-tl--a3'1S--
1S"'1/f..,l.;· Z.323 -:SC:/LM .$' C-Yl '"b,..11)1,1,'\_ c. )Jltw C, [Y.-)'7 C- :~t-1...I ri-w ~-).____ '"" 1/\ -r. / ('_~ L-1 t;'ODO _t.;"172-"I 
/:;;'17 /2--, -oos-~ . D ~ P. v~ (td-? 0 (c... .. 0 7 3 , 0 7 z (_, ' 'R,i. { J.w I h /~:y{:--1:fr_ (Z.fihi-~ I -rz; 1)+ -{::1:;- 0 ~-7 ~~ 
·1s-111/i ,,-· c'2.,,.':>C) Ne,. L.tC. /-Je-rve..- 1J - _,__ c... 'Rr.dJ.-v,l,i._ . hltl:::L ~Sc(\ 1 (cit·u,S-cooS-74-) 
. !:;/ic/2s-~ 03 / i_. -~'#1-b I ::r:: v~ D' f / 2 l, ' I 19 ' c. ·zsc, Id~ ,'h_ 'hlA T ( ('~ l-tScJ()c) 5¥-5~ -
S?i}Jt..,-- 05'{ 1 : OS-- p 11. CL .p(.k' .. ro·74- .,[) ?2- ·c' ~ !c'D, \,.. L.(.)+--IJ_ It-/ <?o \ 73 ;,+ ·i:/: <7S 
1 I . I 
. . . . . 
r 
. ' 
. .. 
. . . .. . . . . ... -- ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . ·-- . .. '.. . . . •,• .. 
'----'----"Jo--------''-----------'-------~-,-------------' 
: l certify that this documen_t i~ a true, exiact, complete and unaltered photocopy of the .. original instr~ment operations log. · .1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
===================\=~=~========================================-=-== 
Title of Action S':::<>, ·~~ , C:, ~~ Judge ~ • G '-~~ 
[\ - ~ \J 0 
Type of Hearing ~>y:::o,.~ Clerk ~ C:,., 
Attorney for Plf. B~--S:-~ Recording2_~~ /~C\ '.;S.,-'S....:;; 
¼(~ ~~~-=~~ 
Attorney for Def. ' · Case No. -
-------
Others Present ~~ ~"'->~~ ~ Date ~<:::i -\S,,.. 
_________________________ Time ____ '\,~''~='~A---;cs--,.~-
WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JlJuICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFI1.ATAH cJ~ \s~-\S:bl 
, ,),·'....,.l..- If'-"·--~·--·-
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
- ''~ :J,,.'1' 2'u'~ E\H IQ: 20 ; u t I,'\ f .l. 
CASE NO. CR-\~- \~~<l)F rns1rncT coum 
-- LJ\TAH COUl·HY 
COMMITMENT -r; _ ~rnffv 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF LATAH: 
An order having been made by me that~ ~ ~ ~ be held to 
answer upon a charge of ~TI:~ ;!;;:..,. ~ ~~ _ committed on or about the 
~ day of S:::::S:-,.,,~ , 20 n_, in the County of Latah, State ofldaho: 
- YOU ARE COMMAND1d> to receive him/her into your custody and detain him/her until he/she is legally 
discharged. 
Dated this ~a day of ___ ___e__~~~,,,,,,,_,_ __ , 20 \:~ 
APPEARANCEDATE \o:~--~ 
MAGISTRATE COURT 
---
DISTRICT COURT 
----
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE~ 
CONDITIONS OF BOND: if'i. Not consume or possess any alcohol. 
liY""_;.e. Not enter any bars or liquor stores. 
~ ;,. Not violate any laws. 
io/ ~aintain contact with his/her attorney. 
~ 5. Must appear at all court hearings. 
o 6. Not consume or possess any controlled 
substances unless lawfully prescribed. 
TO SERVE DAYS JAIL 
---
CREDIT FOR DAYS SERVED 
--
MAYEARN __ DAYSGOODTIME 
o 7. Sign a waiver of extradition before being 
released. 
~Not drive. 
o 9. Not possess any firearms. 
o 10. Not violate any terms of current probation. 
o 11. Have no contact with the victim. 
Report ______________ Release _________ _ 
Report Release _________ _ 
Report Release _________ _ 
COMMITMENT 000022 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS™CT-
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY QJfl liJ'\JT¥\Rl P1'l 5: 3 4 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
'siJ/??1 ~ 
Defendant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. CJ2;;10 i 6 ..., 13 )'q 
~
ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM 
CUSTODY 
/)/1 ~dersigned hereby authorizes the release of 
,___j/~ ~ · from the custodyofthe Sheriff of 
Latah County. 
DATEDTHIS_d._.,__.>G,.C)_dayof µ'73 ,20~ 
CONDITTONS OF RELEASE: .,, b-7 . £ ~ I. Notconsumeorpossessanyalcohol. ~ ~ ~-· ~/~ 
o 2. Not violate any laws. 
o 3. Maintain contact with his/her attorney. 
o 4. Not consume or possess any controlled substances unless lawfully prescribed. 
o 5. Not drive. 
~ ;: ~:'e::;:;;;:.::i:t;,::,;::.bei~ .::~r~~ ~ 
o 8. · Appear at all court hearings. C,V?77./L ~~ 
-'"' 
~~~~
ORDER FOR RELEASE FROM CUSTODY ~  
000023 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Title of Action 0/- UJ ~ 
---~~~-. -~~~----- Judge~ 
Clet?7~ 
l 
Type of Hearing ~1,,0,§ p!Jblte llit~ 
Attorney for P 1 f. __,___~_ITT\Q________________ Recording :;? ; [ I 2c7/ S-
Attorney for Def. ~ctio-(\± 
Others Present 
~~ t}Jr-4\~(Xf' ~(\0 Case No. C'v-LS- /3cP2 
Date 6 ::::)Q-15 
_________________________ Time __ S:~~:~/~B"'~~P~fY\ __ 
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
00002.4 
/~,. -
:ond Judicial District Court, State ' %1aho 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Ivan D Pettit 
3621 Hwy 95 S 
Moscow, ID 8384300000 
Defendant. 
In and For the County of Latah 
522 S. Adams 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
'H)\c ,, .. ,,-.J 21' 
l.l.,, f J :·11~ l 
Case No: CR-2015-0001389 
"
1 in· 1 7 hfi .J  l ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of Ivan D Pettit, and it appearing to be a proper case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the: 
Public Defender's Office 
Latah County Pub. Defender-McCormick, Deborah 
116 E. Third Street, Suite 201 P.O. Box 10005 
Moscow ID 83843 
Public Defender for the County of Latah, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is 
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Ivan D Pettit, in all proceedings in the above entitled case. 
The Defendant is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost 
of court appointed counsel. 
Date: ~ /·:21 l 1 r 
--~-/,+----#-.-----
Copies to: 
LPublic Defender 
¼_Prosecutor 
Deputy Clerk 
Order Appointing Public Defender DOC30 10/88 
00002fj 
Idaho State Police - Uni. m Citation 
In the court designated below the undersigned certifies that he/she has 
just and reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that on: 
Citation#: 
T ISP0354126 
~ Date/Time: 05/20/2015 03:36 AM DR#: L15000585 
l.t\ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 2ND 
S JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH (\ () r\ . 140() STATE OF IDAHO \...,,~-----c,l_()J5 - 0 
I VIOLATOR 
Last Name: PETTIT Ml:D 
First Name:IVAN DOB
Hm. Address: 3621 HWY 95 S Phone
Cty, St, Zip: MOSCOW, ID 8384300000 
Height: 601 Weight: 240 Sex: M Eyes: GRN Hair: BRO 
DL#: DL State: ID Lie. Expires:2017 
Class:
Hazmat:N GVWR 26001 +: N 
Commercial vehicle driven by this driver: N 
Bus. Name: 
Bus. Addr: 
Bus. Phone: 
I REGISTRATION 
Yr. Veh:1995 Veh. Lie#: DNF303 
Make:TOYT Model:COR 
Color: BLK Style: 4D 
VIN: 1 NXAE09B5SZ313644 
Carrier US DOT #: 
I LOCATION 
16+ Persons: N 
State:AK 
Upon a Public Street or Highway or Other Location Namely: 
PARKING LOT OF THE CONOCO ON S. MAIN NEAR TAYLOR 
AVE IN MOSCOW 
I VIOLATIONS 
Did commit the following Offense(s), In violation of State Statute, 
Infraction Citation: N Misdemeanor Citation: Y 
Posted Speed: Observed Speed: Accident: N 
Date/Time: 05/20/2015 02:23 AM 
Violation #1: 118-8001 (3) {M} 
DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES (FIRST OFFENSE); SUSP ID 
1/6/15-4/6/15 FOR DUI 
Violation #2: 
Violation #3: 
Violation #4: 
I COURT INFORMATION 
I SIGNATURE 
I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on [xlo5/20/2015 
Signature of Officer: ________________ _ 
Officer Name: C BALDWIN 
Agency Name:IDAHO STATE POLICE 
Witness: 
Address: 
Department: I OFFICER NOTES 
READ CAREFULLY 
This is a MISDEMEANOR charge in which: 
Officer ID:3113 
Serial#: 
NOTE: If you fail to appear within the time allowed for your 
appearance, another charge of failure to appear may be filed 
and a warrant may be issued for your arrest. 
1. You may be represented by a lawyer, which will be at your 
expense unless the judge finds you are indigent. 
2. You are entitled to a trial by jury if requested by you. 
3. PLEA OF NOT GUILTY: You may plead not guilty to the 
charge by appearing before the clerk of the court or the 
judge, within the time allowed for your appearance, at which 
time you will be given a trial date. 
4. PLEA OF GUil TY: You may plead guilty to the charge by 
going to the clerk of the court, within the time allowed for your 
appearance, at which time you will be told if you can pay a 
fixed fine or whether it will be necessary for you to appear 
before the judge; 
OR 
You may have your fine determined by a judge at a time 
arranged with the clerk of the court, within the time allowed 
for your appearance. 
5. If you plead guilty, you may still give an explanation to the 
judge. 
6. You may call the clerk of the court to determine if you can 
sign a plea of guilty and pay the fine and costs by mail or over 
the Internet by going to: http://courtpay.idaho.gov 
I plead guilty to the charges. 
Defendant (if authorized by clerk of magistrate court) 
MAIL TO: 
LATAH COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT 
PO BOX8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843-0568 
LATAH COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT 
522 SOUTH ADAMS RM 119 
MOSCOW, ID 83843-0568 
(208) 883-2255 
Fine #1: MUST APPEAR 
Fine #2: 
Court Date: 06/08/2015 
Court Time: 08:30 AM 
Fine #3: 
Fine #4: 
00002.6 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Ivan D Pettit 
3621 Hwy 95 S 
Moscow, ID 8384300000 
Defendant. 
md Judicial District Court, State o 
In and For the County of Latah 
522 S. Adams 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
ho 
-. ~ ., ' : ,'-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CR-2015-0001408 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of Ivan D Pettit, and it appearing to be a proper case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the: 
Public Defender's Office 
Latah County Pub. Defender-McCormick, Deborah 
116 E. Third Street, Suite 201 P.O. Box 10005 
Moscow ID 83843 
Public Defender for the County of Latah, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is 
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Ivan D Pettit, in all proceedings in the above entitled case. 
The Defendant is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost 
of court appointed counsel. 
Date: ~/2 f / f )~ 
----z.---1--"----
Copies to: 
_:}(_Public Defender 
__¼:__Prosecutor 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Deputy Clerk 
DOC30 10/88 
00002', 
IN THE DIST ~ f COURT OF THE SECOND JU -IAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PLAINTIFF, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
lj l1 _7·',1 ·- I AOJ' .. ,· .. CASE NO G, \ .:_t() 7 - :.J;) <7 · :,. \ -
PRE-TRIAL MOTION . : ·. ·. _ ,:_1 r1 .. ,:, :i': :~~. C .;_:.,__: t ;.,: ..... .:·-..·i i '- - ..... u 
vs. 
) 
........ i v....._an_]) _· f ____ t ._-+n~+ _ ____,;__ ~ 
DEFENDANT. ) 
(THE STATE) (CITY OF MOSCOW), AND THE DEFENDANT, MOVE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: 
_1. SETTHISCASEON JU.\l)f, 12 ,AT q-'2}0 AM.FOR: 
/A.SET OR INUE PRE-TRIA COURT TRIAL/SENTENCING/STATUS 
__ B. SENTENCING; RECOM TIONS BELOW** 
_c. COURT TRIAL . 
ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE BY DEFENDANT ON THE RECORD. 
__ D. JURY TRIAL 
_2. DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW** 
__ 3. AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. ------------------,------
_4. RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. TERMS DETAILED BELOW**. 
_5. **OTHER /). YWS V}rJT te ( f i'-lcd r1iscn~lltl:3 yd. To ke; 
di ~(wVtlNd \?~ u.{+l 1s 
__ 6. REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - ..... Y=ES:::-:..· ___ ...,N=O ___ --=$ ___ _ 
_ 7. I EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE I UNDERSTAND, AS READ TO ME, MY RIGHTS AS 
AN ACCUSED PERSON; AND I WAIVE FURTHER READING OF THOSE RIGHTS; 
AND WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE A LAWYER REPRESENT ME. 
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IN THE COMPLAINT IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUil TY. 
X __________________ DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE 
DATED: 
MOTION IS: 
_APPROVED 
_DENIED 
. DEFENDANTIDEFENNEY 
_GUILTY PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS 
CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.) 
THE DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUil TY; FINED $ __________ INCLUDING COSTS. 
MOTION HEARING __________ _ 
JURY PRE-TRIAL. ___________ _ John C. Judge 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
JURY/COURT TRIAL __________ _ 
SENTENCING ____________ _ 
000028 
Oo"icorl AM 11 i:; 
IN THE DISTRl COURT OF THE SECOND JUD_ \L DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PLAINTIFF, 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
l vcu1 l>. ·rcH ( + ~ 
...a...-------------- ) DEFENDANT. ) 
PRE-TRIAL MOTION '· - , J ~-2 r i 1 
{THE STATE) (CITY OF MOSCOW), AND THE DEFENDANT, MOVE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: 
;-, .. <i r 
0· .JO 
_1. SET THIS CASE ON J L:\V\fz 1--,?y , AT q; 2,D ls_. M. FOR:.,,,,/ 
~- SET OR ONTINU
0
E PRE-TRI . /COURT TRIAL/SENTENCING/STATUS 
_B. SENTENCI , ATIONS BELOW** 
__ C. COURT TRIAL 
ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE BY DEFENDANT ON THE RECORD. 
_D. JURY TRIAL 
_2. DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW** 
_3. AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. ___________________ _. 
_4. RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. TERMS DETAILED BELOW**. 
_5.**0THER 1> b4..c ro± wcti'l,d ai'"e»i<J.Y ucl- 1c k, 
d \ r C.-OY a.rd b,j ~ [ 4:[ 15; 
_6. REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - ..... Y=ES ____ . __ ..,_N=O ___ _,$..__ _ _ 
_ 7. I EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE I UNDERSTAND, AS READ TO ME, MY RIGHTS AS 
AN ACCUSED PERSON; AND I WAIVE FURTHER READING OF THOSE RIGHTS; 
AND WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE A LAWYER REPRESENT ME. 
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IN THE COMPLAINT IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUil TY. 
X. __________________ DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE 
DATED: 
MOTION IS: 
_APPROVED 
_DENIED 
_GUILTY PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS 
CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.) 
THE DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUil TY; FINED $ __________ INCLUDING COSTS. 
MOTION HEARING __________ _ 
JURY PRE-TRIAL. ___________ _ 
,lohnfE ~ MAGISTRA ~ ~~-
JURY/COURT TRIAL. __________ _ 
SENTENCING. ____________ _ 
000029 
Revised 4/1/15 
IN THE DISTI .T COURT OF THE SECOND JU[ IAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PLAINTIFF, 
> CASE NO Cf2- .... 'J{) I 5 .... 13 <i? q ~ ~ : , : · 
) 
) PRE-TRIAL MOTION 
) ) :i_E~'.u:///(~:~{ i, i' 
YL-t-n:\:J l\/aV\ ~ rv n-:iu-r;· ' 
vs. 
DEFENDANT. ) :; ; _______________ _ 
~(CITY OF MOSCOW), AND THE DEFENDANT, MOVE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: 
....;is_ 1. SET THIS CASE ON ~,Ag '.U , AT q : fil. M. FOR: ./ 
~-SET OR ~INUE PRE-TRIAL/COURT TRIAL/SENTENCING/STATUS 
_B. SENTEN'eJNG; RECOMMENDinoN-S BELOW** 
_c. COURT TRIAL 
ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE BY DEFENDANT ON THE RECORD. 
_D. JURY TRIAL 
_2. DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW** 
_3. AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. _________________ _ 
_ 4. _RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. -TERMS DETAILED BELOW"'*. 
_s. **OTHER A neeaSd\W\( :jp Y}'.S,an,l;i am JJSW+S wtlv) S¾l-tv. 
_6. REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - __ YE __ S _____ ,..,N=O ____ $_____ _ 
_ 7. -1 EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE I UNDERSTAND, AS READ TO ME, MY RIGHTS AS 
AN ACCUSED PERSON; AND I WAIVE FURTHER READING OF THOSE RIGHTS; 
AND WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE A LAWYER REPRESENT ME. 
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IN THE COMPLAINT IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUILTY. 
X __________________ .DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE 
DATED: 
MOTION IS: 
_APPROVED 
_DENIED , 
_GUil TY PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS 
CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.) 
THE DEF~NDANT IS FOUND GUILTY; FINED $ __________ .INC~UDING COSTS. 
("'' 
MOTION HEARING __________ _ John C. Judge, 
JURY PRE-TRIA ____________ _ 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
JURY/COURT TRIAL _________ _ 
SENTENCING ___________ _ 
000030 
n-.. : __ _, Al'4l'41::. 
IN THE DISTRI COURT OF THE SECOND JUD1 \L DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__.__!Vi_OJl_t>___._. Tt-=-i.~f~-h-'--t-~- ~ 
DEFENDANT. ) 
CASE NO 
PRE-TRIAL MOTION 
(THE STAil) {CITY OF MOSCOW), AND THE DEFENDANT, MOVE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: /' 
~- SET THIS CASE ON 7(2-1 /IS- . AT 9-dl) a...,. M. FOR: 
ii -
\,/"A.SET OR CONTINUE ~E-TRIAL OURT TRIAL/SENTENCING/STATUS 
_B. SENTENCING; RECOMME ATIONS BELOW** 
__ C. COURT TRIAL 
ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE BY DEFENDANT ON THE RECORD. 
_D. JURY TRIAL 
_2. DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW** 
_3. AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. ___________________ _. 
_4. RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. TERMS DETAILED BELOW**. 
_5. **OTHER. __________________________ _ 
_ 6. REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - ~YE=S ___ . ___ .:..:N=O ____ $ ___ _ 
_ 7. I EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE I UNDERSTAND, AS READ TO ME, MY RIGHTS AS 
AN ACCUSED PERSON; AND I WAIVE FURTHER READING OF THOSE RIGHTS; 
AND WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE A LAWYER REPRESENT ME. 
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IN THE COMPLAINT IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUil TY. 
X __________________ DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE 
DATED: 
MOTION IS: 
_APPROVED 
__ DENIED 
_GUil TY PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS 
CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.) 
THE DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUil TY; FINED $ __________ INCLUDING COSTS. 
MOTION HEARING __________ _ 
JURY PRE-TRIAL ___________ _ John C. Judge 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
JURY/COURT TRIAL __________ _ 
SENTENCING ____________ _ 
000031 
Oo\lieorl AM f1 i:; 
IN THE DISTR~ COURT OF THE SECOND JUD. AL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___ /v_~_vi_~_1 e_-l/-_ .. 1_·--\-______ ~-
PRE-TRIAL MOTION - ~ i 5 JUL 2 I AN /0: f 7 
;_:LE Rt J¥.:; w nt(f// :) (\ .: 
DEFENDANT. ) 
BY 
-----o;-.or1-v 
_,Vi I 
(THE STATE) (CITY OF MOSCOW), AND THE DEFENDANT, MOVE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: 
~ ;o j1Lf . - . o - 2/,A 
~1_- SET THIS CASE ON . r . ( 0 , AT ~ - -..x_.,,-· M. FOR: 
_A. SET OR CONTINUE PRE-TRIAL/COURT TRIAL/SENTENCING/STATUS 
_B. SENTENCING; RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW** 
_c. COURT TRIAL 
_jyTC 
ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE BY DEFENDANT ON THE RECORD. 
_LD. JURY TRIAL 
__2. DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW** 
_3. AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. __________________ _ 
_ 4 .. RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. TERMS DETAILED BELOW**. 
_5.**0THE '--------------------------
_6. REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - -=-Y=Es ____ .... No ____ $ ___ _ 
_ 7 •. 1 EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE I UNDERSTAND, AS READ TO ME, MY RIGHTS AS 
AN ACCUSED PERSON; AND I WAIVE FURTHER READING OF THOSE RIGHTS; 
AND WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE A LAWYER REPRESENT ME. 
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IN THE COMPLAINT IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUILTY. 
X __________________ DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE 
DATED:~·--1_,_;;;J-_/_-_/_S ___ ___ 
-{~y{ d-t> web U1c:c 
IOlJON IS: 
~PPRO D 
_DENIE 
_GUil PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS 
CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.) 
"t E EF~NDANT IS FOUND GUILTY; FINED $ __________ INCLUDING COSTS. 
MOTION HEARING. __________ _ 
1~ . JURY PRE-TRIA-.L _____ ~-~""'---3____ ,'_-.30___,~n"-.a::i.....,___ 
~OURT TRIAL. __ ' .... 0/2___,.,. .... ; ...... __ 4_.' 3..,~........,;; __ 
SENTENCING ___________ _ 000032 
Revised 4/1/15 
IN THE DIST. -::T COURT OF THE SECOND JU._ ...:IAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
) CASENO Cfl--~tt;- l-3''2>:J · .. STATE OF IDAHO, 
PLAINTIFF, ) ... ·.1 j ,.) ii.'/ 
'-'U 2" ) PRE-TRIAL MOTION ,,: ~ <- c: 4/i '0· r 
vs. '·i..t_O•,, /1 • ~/. ) '~,, C\r- n~ r, __ "-" L -·~-;--"' ;--;1.::.1 /!10,. ) lii.r-tr· C--- t,.._.; r,,.,. ) B}/ / l!UJrry'- ~!U,?7 
Ped::htj \vitV\ ) --------------
DEFENDANT. ) D[Purr 
~) (CITY OF MOSCOW), AND THE/?EFENDANT, MOVE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: 
- . /LY 
.:f--1. SET THIS CASE ON UC f )::_ , :JO I< , AT q''. 1'.J _a_. M. FOR: 0 ~p~ . .;;l. "t; -toir-
.JP"rc__ _A. SET OR CONTINUE PRE-TRIAL/COURT TRIAL/SENTENCING/STATUS 
_B. SENTENCING; RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW** 
_c. COURT TRIAL 
-V' ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD BY DEFENDANT 
~D. JURY TRIAL 
_2. DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW** 
__ 3. AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. ___________________ __,. 
__ 4. RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. TERMS DETAILED BELOW**. 
Ls ... OTHER :~~~~~'.W;~=C< cJQ;ty a~J 
_6. REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - ...... YE ...... S _______ N~O ____ $..__ __ _ 
_ 7. I EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE I UNDERSTAND, AS READ TO ME, MY RIGHTS AS 
AN ACCUSED PERSON; AND I WAIVE FURTHER READING OF THOSE RIGHTS; 
AND WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE A LAWYER REPRESENT ME. 
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IN THE COMPLAINT IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUILTY. 
X. ___________________ DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE 
' ,s-
M9JION IS 
_LAPP OVED D 
~DE IED 
_L_G ILTY PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS I CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.) 
DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUILTY; FINED $ __________ INCLUDING COSTS. 
MOTION HEARING __________ _ 
JURY PRE-TRIAL Q/:ujJ5 0- 3 ,: 1-t2pcn 
~URT TRIAL /O}Jjjt5 0 3'.':30 ltt'11 
SENTENCING ____________ _ 
,-~ ~ l___ ~ ;VL/\_ 
MA ~JUDGE -------
000033 
Deborah L. McCormick, ISBN 7223 
McCORMICK LAW OFFICE 
116 E. Third St., Ste. 201 
P.O. Box 10005 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208) 301-9291 
Facsimile: (866) 985-8098 
Attorney for Defendant 
L~;'-,,.1,,,·. - "--.•1'TV 
: .. ,, 
1 
--~---· ·.~ ~ 1 '..' 1 1 
(;;----
' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-15-1389 
CR-15-1408 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Defendant Ivan Drake Pettit, by and through his attorney, Deborah L. McCormick, 
hereby requests an order suppressing all evidence obtained against him in these matters as a 
result of the traffic stop that occurred on May 20, 2015, on Highway 95 S., in Moscow, Latah 
County, Idaho. 
This motion is brought on the grounds that Idaho code§ 49-808(1) is void for vagueness 
as applied to the defendant because it does not give fair notice that a tum signal is required when 
following the continued course of a highway. In addition this motion is brought on the grounds 
that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures 
because the officer did not have cause to stop Mr. Pettit for failure to use a tum signal. I.C. § 
49-808 does not require a driver to signal when the driver remains in his lane of travel and 
merely follows the curvature of the highway on which he travels, and were Mr. Pettit to have 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 1 
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used his tum signal in this particular situation, this would have signaled to any other motorist 
that he intended to shift lanes. 
Highway 95 travels through Moscow, Latah County, Idaho. However, at north and south 
ends of town, the north and south bound lanes are divided by two city blocks. See map attached 
as Exhibit 1. Heading south through Moscow, the highway consists of three southbound lanes 
until the far left lane turns into Highway 8 headed east, and the two right lanes continue on as 
Highway 95 South. See map attached as Exhibit 2. 
On May 20, 2015, Defendant was traveling south on Highway 95 in the center lane. As 
he approached the intersection referred to by Sergeant Clint Baldwin as the "S. Main couplet," 
he maintained his lane of travel in the center lane, and followed the signage to continue his route 
along Highway 95 South. Defendant did not activate a signal to indicate intention to move right 
or left upon Highway 95 South as he proceeded past this intersection and Defendant continued to 
maintain his lane of travel. Sgt. Clint A. Baldwin stopped Defendant for failure to signal and 
subsequently arrested him for Driving Under the Influence and cited him for Driving Without 
Privileges. 
I. I.C. § 49-808 IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS APPLIED 
TO THIS DEFENDANT 
Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to this defendant because it does 
not give fair notice that a tum signal is required when continuing upon the course of a highway. 
Specifically, Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) states: 
No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway 
unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety 
nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 2 000035 
In regards to statutory construction "[t]he plain, obvious and rational meaning is always 
preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational meaning. State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1998). Applying the plain obvious and rational meaning of Idaho Code § 49-
808( 1 ), to hold that the Defendant was in violation of this statute would violate his right to due 
process of law when did not exit or enter a highway or move to the left or right upon the 
highway, but merely followed the course of his lane of travel. 
The theory of due process oflaw at issue in this case is one of basic fairness. Specifically, 
it is a requirement " ... that all "be informed as to what the State commands or forbids" and that 
"men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law." 
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 748 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010), (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
566, 574 (1974)). This is a requirement that is derived from the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which gave rise to the void for vagueness doctrine. 
The void for vagueness doctrine is a doctrine whereby a statute is declared void either 
facially, or as applied to a specific defendant's conduct. For a successful claim of void for 
vagueness as applied to a specific defendant's conduct, it must be shown that " ... the statute 
failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific conduct was prohibited or failed to 
provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to 
charge the complainant." Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 748 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010). In other 
words, a statute can be declared void for vagueness as applied to a specific defendant's conduct 
if the statute " ... fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the 
conduct it proscribes ... " Id. This means that if a statute does not enable a regular person to 
understand whether their actions are appropriate in a specific situation, that situation being the 
same one the defendant experienced, then the statute is void for vagueness as applied. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 3 
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This is not the first time that the requirements ofldaho Code § 49-808(1) have been 
analyzed by Idaho Courts. In State v. Dewbre the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this statute 
applying an analysis based on implications of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. In that case the defendant was travelling on Highway 57 in 
Bonner County when he was stopped for violating the signal requirement of Idaho Code § 49-
808(1 ). State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 664 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999). The particular section of the 
highway in the direction where the defendant was travelling had changed from one lane to two 
lanes, which was signed to keep right accept to pass. Id. At the end of the passing lane were more 
signs that indicated that the right lane was coming to an end and directed motorists to merge left. 
Id. The defendant entered the right, lane and continued in that lane until the lane merged into the 
left hand lane. When the lane merged into the left hand lane the defendant merged without using 
his tum signal. Id. The defendant was stopped and eventually charged with Driving Under the 
Influence. Id. 
In that case, the Court did not address the argument regarding whether the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because the issue was not raised prior to the appeal. Id at 667. However, 
the Court did find that the defendant was required to use his signal to indicate his specific 
movement upon the highway. Id. This was because the Court found that the defendant had 
" .. . moved his vehicle to the right ... " when he entered the right lane, and when the right lane 
ended and the defendant merged back into the left lane it "required a turning movement to the 
left." Id. at 666 (emphasis in the original). It is important to note that no opinion in this case, 
which was decided by a three judge panel, commanded a majority opinion. In his concurring 
opinion Judge Schwartzman stated, " ... many an Idaho driver would, in custom and practice, see 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 4 
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no need to operate a tum signal in this hyper-technical situation." Id at 667 (Schwartzman J. 
concurring in the result). Furthermore, In Judge McDermott's dissenting opinion he cautioned: 
Judicial interpretation of a statute should 'aim to give it sensible 
construction' such as will effectuate legislative intent while, if 
possible, avoiding an absurd conclusion." Requiring a driver to 
signal when he or she is traveling in essentially a straight line, and 
as required by the posted signs, may confuse, rather than alert, 
other drivers. 
Id. at 668, (McDermott J. Dissenting), ( citing Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1988)). Thus, the court in Dewbre acknowledged lateral movement upon a highway places an 
individual under the ambit of the statute. However, in its concurring opinion, the court admitted 
that signaling in these types of situations could result in confusion to other potential motorists. 
In Burton v. State the Idaho Court of Appeals once again addressed LC. § 49-808(1 ). This 
time the Court directly dealt with the issue of whether LC.§ 49-808(1) was void for vagueness 
as applied to a particular defendant. Ultimate]y, the Court held that LC.§ 49-808(1) was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant. Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 750 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2010). 
Interestingly, the facts leading up to the stop were virtually identical to the facts in 
Devvbre. The defendant, Burton, was driving when she approached an expansion of lanes in her 
direction of travel, signed for the purposes of passing. Id at 747 Burton remained in the right 
hand lane until the double lanes were about to end, which was signed that the lanes merged, and 
she did not signal at the point of the terminus of the right hand lane. Id. She was subsequently 
stopped by a law enforcement officer and investigated for Driving Under the Influence. Id. 
On appeal, Defendant argued that "[t]he statue does not give notice ... that such continued 
forward movement constitutes "moving" a vehicle "right or left upon a highway."" Id at 749. In 
its decision, the court states that the statute is void for vagueness as applied because " ... the 
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statute does not specify how much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to 
trigger the duty to signal." Id. The court goes on to state that: 
... the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly literal 
application to every type of side to side movement, for a vehicle 
literally moves to the left or the right when a driver weaves a bit 
within his or her lane or simply negotiates a bend in the road, but 
no one would contend that a signal is required in those instances. 
Id. In short, the Court in Burton found that I.C. § 49-808(1) was void for vagueness as applied to 
the defendant because it would be guesswork for people of ordinary intelligence to attempt to 
determine whether they were required to use a turn signal when faced with the factual scenario 
that the defendant was faced with. 
Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to Ivan Drake Pettit. To begin, 
unlike the defendant in Dewbre, Mr. Pettit moved neither left nor right directionally upon 
Highway 95 South, but instead moved forward directionally while maintaining his lane of travel 
upon Highway 95 South. Specifically, Mr. Pettit's movement of his vehicle is akin to rounding a 
curve in a road, albeit a curve precipitated by a traffic light and signage indicating the curve in 
Highway 95 South. As the Court cautioned in Burton, it is impracticable to literally interpret the 
statute whenever a vehicle moves laterally, and Mr. Pettit's movement on May 20, 2015 was 
comparable to rounding a bend in a road. In applying I.C. § 49-808(1) to this type of situation, 
people of ordinary intelligence would not know to signal and would view a signal as indicating 
either a turn or a lane change. Therefore, because of the foregoing reasons and in light of the lack 
of guidance the statute gives in regards to how much or what type of movement triggers the 
statute, I.C. § 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to Mr. Pettit. 
Because the statute is void for vagueness as applied to Mr. Pettit, there was no legal cause 
for the stop and all evidence obtained as a result should be suppressed. 
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II. DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SIGNAL A RIGHT TURN 
UNDER I.C. § 49-808 
Alternatively, Mr. Petit contends that Officer Baldwin lacked reasonable articulable 
suspicion to effectuate the stop. Mr. Pettit bases his contention on the fact that LC. § 49-808(1) 
does not require the use of a tum signal when rounding a bend in a highway. Therefore, Mr. 
Pettit contends that all evidence obtained as a result of the stop should be suppressed. 
When a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for an alleged violation of law, this in 
tum implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
because it affects a seizure upon the vehicle's occupants. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 411,417 
(1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-558 (1976). For a law enforcement 
officer to perform a lawful stop of a vehicle, the law enforcement officer must have reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is driven in a manner that is contrary to the law. See, e.g., 
Terry v. Ohio, 392, U.S. 1 (1968); see also, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). 
Furthermore this suspicion is evaluated by looking at " ... the totality of the circumstances at the 
time of the stop ... " and is a standard that requires less than probable cause but must be" ... more 
than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663,665 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999). Importantly, the suspicion will not be considered reasonable if it was 
based on the observance of" ... the broad range of what can be described as normal driving 
behavior." State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996). 
The above cited case of Dewbre is an example of these principals of law as applied to a 
defendant's conduct in relation to I.C. § 49-808(1). As previously discussed, the Court held that 
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the officer had justification to stop the defendant because of the defendant's actions in moving 
the vehicle right and left upon the highway. Dewbre 133 Idaho at 667. Specifically, the road the 
defendant was traveling on had road signs and arrows designed to let travelers know that the 
right lane was coming to an end and must merge into the remaining left lane. Id at 664. Because 
the defendant did not signal when he merged from the ending right lane into the left lane, the 
officer had cause to stop him. 
Other cases have also applied these principals oflaw to a particular defendant's conduct 
in relation to LC.§ 49-808(1). See also, e.g., State v. Colvin, 341 P.3d 598 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2014). One such case is Idaho v. Spies, where a defendant was stopped after making several lane 
changes without signaling. Idaho v. Spies, 335 P.3d 609,610 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). 
Specifically, the defendant made four separate lane changes without signaling, the last of which 
was described as swerving "pretty violently." Id. In that case the Court held that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because when he " ... moved the vehicle from the 
temporary lanes into the main lane of travel, he was required to signal." Id at 614. 
The evidence obtained after the initial stop of Mr. Pettit should be suppressed because, 
based on a totality of the circumstances, Officer Baldwin lacked the requisite reasonable 
articulable suspicion to effectuate the stop. To begin, Mr. Pettit's driving pattern prior to the stop 
can best be described as an exhibition of normal driving behavior. Officer Baldwin based his 
reasonable articulable suspicion on Mr. Pettit not using his tum signal to continue in his lane of 
travel on Highway 95 South. Specifically, LC. § 49-808 describes entering or exiting a highway, 
or moving right or let upon a highway, without the use of a tum signal. Mr. Pettit was not 
entering or exiting a highway but merely continuing on Highway 95 in his same lane of travel. 
Additionally, Mr. Pettit was not moving right or left upon the highway as contemplated by the 
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statute but instead was rounding a bend in the highway. It is important to note that Officer 
Baldwin did not observe any indicators of impaired driving on the part of Mr. Pettit such as 
weaving within or outside of his lane, speeding, driving to slowly, or any other erratic driving 
pattern. Finally, it would violate notions of common sense for LC. § 49-808(1) to apply to 
situations when a driver remains in his lane of travel and merely follows the curvature of the 
road. Such a result would require drivers to signal every time the roadway had a bend. Further, 
requiring a signal at the location of this case would have resulted in other drivers being confused 
as to whether Mr. Pettit intended to maintain his lane of travel or to change lanes into the far 
right lane. As indicated by the Court in Burton, expecting Mr. Pettit to signal when following his 
lane of travel around a bend in the highway would be unreasonable. 
To conclude, LC. § 49-808 did not require Defendant to signal a right turn in this 
particular situation. Therefore, based on a totality of the circumstances, Sgt. Baldwin did not 
have reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Defondant for failing to signal. Therefore, all 
evidence obtained as a result of that stop should be suppressed. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for the following relief: 
1. That the Court enter an Order suppressing all evidence obtained as a result of the 
traffic stop on the grounds that Idaho Code § 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to 
Defendant and, therefore, there was no lawful reason to stop Defendant. 
2. In the alternative, that the Court enter an Order Suppressing Evidence that was 
obtained as a result of the traffic stop on the grounds that Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) does not apply 
to the specific circumstances of this case and, therefore, Officer Baldwin did not have cause to 
stop Defendant. 
4. For such other relief as the court may deem just and proper. 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE 
ASHLEY S. ROKYTA 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208)883-2246 
ISB No. 8491 
()_::-.~:~. ~-~- (·::. 
Q~· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Piaintiff, 
V. 
IV AN D. PETTIT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
Case No. CR-2015-0001389 
CR-2015-0001408 
MOTION TO VACATE JURY 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND 
TO CONTINUE JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through Ashley S. Rokyta, Latah County 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, moves the Court for an order vacating the jury pre-trial 
conference scheduled for September 29, 2015, and continuing the jury trial currently 
scheduled for October 16, 2015, to a date and time convenient for Court and counsel. In 
support, the State represents to the Court that Ashley Rokyta is currently scheduled to be 
gone the week of September 28, 2015, for training and will be unavailable for the jury pre-
MOTION TO VACATE JURY PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE AND TO CONTINUE JURY TRIAL: Page -1-
i 
000046 
trial conference. The State also represents to the Court that there is currently a motion to 
suppress hearing scheduled for October 15, 2015, and based upon the outcome of the 
hearing will determine whether or not the case goes to trial. 
DATED this ~ay of September, 2015. 
Ashley s~Na~~ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Vacate Jury 
Pre-Trial Conference and to Continue Jury Trial was: 
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
/hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Deborah L. McCormick 
Attorney at Law 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this I !"th day of September, 2015. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IV AN D. PETTIT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2015-0001389 
CR-2015-0001408 
ORDER VACA TING JURY 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND 
CONTINUING JURY TRIAL 
The above matter having come before the Court upon a Motion of the State and 
good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the jury pre-trial conference scheduled for 
September 29, 2015, IS vacated and the jury trial scheduled for October 16, 2015, is 
rescheduled to tJ J 2 3 2015, at £:.' 3o Q_ .m. ~ ~Q ~TPTc 
/) . ./2_,Q_.,<J.-~~_.f:- efo Ocf-~ rcr, ~/1s-;· o-{ '{[00~ I 
DATED this J J i--day of September, 2015. · M 
~/~',  
· gistrate Judge 
ORDER VACATING JURY PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
AND CONTINUING JURY TRIAL: Page -1-
· 0 0 0 04 9 ; 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER VACATING JURY 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND CONTINUING JURY TRIAL were served on the 
following in the manner indicated below: 
Deborah L. McCormick 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mail 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] Fax 
~nd Delivery 
William W. Thompson, Jr. [] U.S. Mail 
Prosecuting Attorney [] Overnight Mail 
Latah County Courthouse [] Fax 
Moscow, ID 83843 ~d Delivery 
'(-rt-Dated this l - day of September, 2015. 
HENRIANNE K. WESTBERG 
Latah County Clerk of the Court 
By:~~tt 
DepuClerk..., 
ORDER VACA TING JURY PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
AND CONTINUING JURY TRIAL: Page -2-
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
ASHLEY ROKYT A 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 8491 
,: ,:, ~0(5-t38C( 
, :, , ., Sc? 2 2 ? r; I : 4 9 
s '(_, ______ ~_ :.: ? j T'/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2015-1389 
CR-2015-1408 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPRESS EVIDENCE 
The State of Idaho, by and through Ashley Rokyta, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, 
respectfully submits the following response to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 20, 2015, at about 2:23 a.m., Idaho State Police Sergeant Clint Baldwin 
conducted a routine traffic stop of a black Toyota Corolla in the parking lot of the Conoco 
Station on S. Main St. near Taylor Ave. in Moscow, Idaho for failure to signal a right tum at the 
traffic controlled intersection of U.S. 95/Jackson St. and U.S. 95/S. Main St. The Defendant was 
driving in the center lane on Jackson St., approaching the intersection during a right green arrow. 
The Defendant failed to signal 100 feet _before making the right-hand turn onto S. Main St. as 
required by the right green arrow signal at the traffic controlled intersection. Upon making 
contact with the driver, Defendant Ivan Drake Petit, Sergeant Baldwin noted the odor of an 
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alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle, the Defendant's eyes were glassy in appearance, and 
the Defendant's speech was slow and slurred. The Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol 
prior to driving. 
Sergeant Baldwin ran a driver's check on the Defendant and had the Defendant exit the 
vehicle to perform the standardized field sobriety evaluations. The Defendant reached the 
necessary decision points on all three field sobriety evaluations and was further detained for 
breath alcohol concentration testing. After listening to the ALS advisory and after a fifteen-
minute waiting period, the Defendant provided two breath samples on the LifeLoc FC20. The 
LifeLoc FC20 indicated a breath alcohol concentration level of .126 and .119. The Defendant 
was subsequently arrested and cited for Driving Under the Influence (DUI), Second Offense, in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 18-8005( 4 ). The Defendant was also cited for Driving Without 
Privileges in accordance with LC.§ 18-8001 as the Defendant was suspended in Idaho from 
January 6, 2015 through April 6, 2015, and failed to reinstate his driving privileges. 
ANALYSIS 
Sergeant Baldwin conducted a lawful, routine traffic stop and DUI Investigation of the 
Defendant in accordance with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer 
is justified in stopping a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if articulable facts 
known to the officer give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary 
to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417, 101 S.Ct. 690,694 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 
628 (1981); State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930,932,829 P.2d 520,522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 
131 Idaho 205,208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 {Ct. App. 1998). Whether a reasonable suspicion existed 
is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances and the facts available to the officer 
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at the moment of the seizure. State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12,878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct. App. 
1994 ). Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation 
or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. 
First, the Defendant argues that Idaho Code § 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied 
to his particular conduct because LC. § 49-808(1) does not give notice that a turn signal is 
required "when continuing upon the course of a highway." Second, the Defendant argues that a 
turn signal is not required when "rounding a bend in a highway." The Defendant's arguments are 
without merit. The Defendant was in violation of LC. § 49-808(1) for failing to signal when 
turning a vehicle onto a highway. LC. § 49-808 (1) states: 
No person-shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle or 
move a vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit 
from a highway unless and until the movement can be made with 
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
LC. § 49-808 (2) states how a driver must signal when required: 
A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required 
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-
access highways and before turning from a parked position, the 
signal shall be given for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all 
other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet 
traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
This portion of the U.S. 95 is not a controlled access highway because private property 
abuts and accesses U.S. 95/Jackson St. This Court need only determine if the right green arrow at 
a traffic-controlled intersection requires a turn, which according to the LC. § 29-808(2) driver's 
are required to signal the last 100 feet traveled before turning. Idaho Code§ 49-801(1) states: 
The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions· of any traffic-
control device placed or held in accordance with the provisions of 
this title, unless otherwise directed by a peace officer, subject to the 
exceptions granted the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle 
by this title. 
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Idaho code § 49-802( 1 )(b) explains what a motorist must do upon 
approaching a green arrow signal at a traffic-control device: 
A driver facing a green arrow signal, shown alone or in 
combination with another indication, shall enter the intersection 
only to make the movement indicated by the green arrow, or other 
movement that is permitted by other indications shown at the same 
time. 
According to LC. § 49-802(l)(b), drivers facing a right green arrow are necessarily 
entering an intersection as defined by LC. § 49-110(1 O)(a): 
The area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the 
lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the 
roadways of two (2) highways which join one another at, right 
angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different 
highways joining at any other angle may come into conflict. 
The facts are not in dispute. In this case, the green arrow signal from the Defendant's 
center lane position on the Jackson St. portion of U.S 95 South was a right green arrow signal 
indicating that the driver is only allowed to tum right, which is the movement indicated by the 
green arrow. There are no other indications or movements allowed other than a right.,hand turn 
from the center lane when approaching this intersection. The defendant failed to signal 100 feet 
before the intersection and did not continue to use a signal during the tum as required by LC. § 
49-808(2). The Defendant was required to make a right-hand turn when approaching the 
intersection in the center lane based on LC.§ 49-801 and LC. § 49-802(l)(b). Sergeant Baldwin 
witnessed the Defendant's failure to use a signal at the intersection and conducted a traffic stop. 
Further, the Defendant relies on State v. Dewbre and Burton v. State in his motion to the 
court. These two cases govern a defendant's conduct when two lanes on a highway merge into 
one lane and the "no person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left 
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upon a highway" requirement of LC. § 49-808( 1 ). State v. Dewbre held that "there are no 
exceptions in I.C. § 49-808 to the signal requirement." The court further held "whenever a 
movement is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement is made 
necessary to comply with highway signage, an appropriate signal is required." 133 Idaho 663, 
991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999). Burton v. State, held that the section was constitutionally vague 
"when applied to a highway where two lanes merge with neither lane clearly ending and neither 
clearly continuing." 149 Idaho 746,240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010). As to the facts in this case, 
there is not a merging of highway lanes situation or a passing lane on a controlled access 
highway question. Neither Dewbre nor Burton involved traffic..:controlled intersections that must 
be obeyed requiring a turn on a right green arrow. In this case the Defendant was clearly turning 
onto a highway from a right green arrow at a traffic-controlled intersection, thus a signal was 
required. 
This Court need only look to the statutes and apply the defendant's conduct. When a 
driver is faced with a right green arrow at a traffic-controlled signal, a driver is necessarily 
entering an intersection. When entering an intersection on a right green arrow, a driver is 
necessarily turning onto a highway and making the only movement allowed by the traffic control 
signal at the intersection, which in this case is a right turn. When turning onto a highway, LC. § 
49-808(1) applies and a signal is required. There are no statutory exceptions to the signaling 
requirement when entering an intersection governed by a traffic-control device and a right-hand 
turn must to be made, even if it is the only movement allowed. 
Alternatively, should this Court find that the statute is vague as the Defendant's conduct 
because he was continuing on a bend in the highway, Sergeant Baldwin's interpretation of the 
Idaho Statutes resulting in a reasonable mistake of law still gives rise to the reasonable suspicion 
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required to conduct a traffic stop. 
Reasonable suspicion, as required for a traffic stop, can rest on a reasonable mistake of 
law. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 538 (2014). In Heien, the defendant was pulled 
over by a police officer for having only one functioning brake light. Id. at 534. The North 
Carolina Statute was vague as to the defendant's conduct because the statute in question required 
one rear lamp, not two brake lights. Id. at 535. The Court held that when an officer conducts a 
traffic stop and the reasonable suspicion for the stop was based on a mistake of law, the 
reasonable suspicion justifying the stop remains, so long as the officer's mistake of law was 
reasonable. Id. at 540. 
Even if the court finds that the statute is vague as to the Defendant's conduct under LC. § 
49-808( 1 ), Sergeant Baldwin made a reasonable mistake of law because the Defendant 
approached a traffic-controlled intersection and the right green arrow indicates to drivers that 
they are to make a right-hand tum, and only a right-hand tum, when entering the intersection as 
required by LC.§ 49-802(l)(b). The Defendant did not use a signal 100 feet before the 
intersection as required by I.C. § 49-808(2). It is reasonable interpretation of law, even if 
mistaken, for an officer to think that a driver failing to signal before making a right-hand tum at a 
traffic-controlled intersection with a right green arrow has violated Title 49 of the Idaho Code. It 
is important to note that the Defendant was not charged with an infraction for failing to signal in 
this case. The Defendant failing to signal gave rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion for the 
traffic stop because it was reasonable for.Sergeant Baldwin to suspect the Defendant's conduct 
was illegal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the routine, lawful traffic stop of the Defendant was valid under both the Fourth 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court case law, and Idaho case law, the State respectfully requests 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress be denied in its entirety. 
DATED this~ day September 2015. 
~~~ AshleyRokyta 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Motion to Supress was: 
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
J_ hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Deborah L. McCormick 
McCormick Law Office 
Courthouse Mail 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this ?Q: day of September, 2015. 
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Deborah L. McCormick, ISBN 7223 
McCORMICK LAW OFFICE 
116 E. Third St., Ste. 201 
P.O. Box 10005 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208) 301-9291 
Facsimile: (866) 985-8098 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-15-1389 
CR-15-1408 
REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE 
Defendant Ivan Drake Pettit, by and through his attorney, Deborah L. McCormick, 
replies to the State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress as follows: 
The traffic stop in this matter violates Defendant's rights under both the the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The State maintains that Defendant's arguments are moot because reasonable suspicion for a 
stop can rest on a law enforcement officer's reasonable mistake of law. The State relies on 
Heien v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __ , 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) as support for this proposition. 
However, this argument fails for two reasons. 
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1. Because the Idaho Constitution Provides More Protection than the U.S. 
Constitution, an Officer's Mistake of Law cannot be the Basis for a Traffic 
Stop in Idaho. 
It is well established that Article 1 § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides more 
protections than does the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. State v. 
Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519 (2012). See aslo State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v. 
Conner, 59 Idaho 695 (1939); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992); State v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469 (2001). In Donato, the Court held "[t]here is absolutely nothing ... that commits this 
Court to construe or apply Article I, § 17 [ of the Idaho Constitution] in the same manner as the 
United States Supreme Court construes or applies the Fourth Amendment." 135 Idaho 469,471 
(2001) (quoting State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 749 (1988)). "Long gone are the days when 
state courts will blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology 
when in the process of interpreting their own constitutions." Id. ( quoting State v. Newman, 108 
Idaho 5, 10 (1985)). 
Our Court has found that "Article I, § 17 provides greater protection than the U.S 
Supreme Court's construction of the Fourth Amendment based on "the uniqueness of our state, 
the [uniqueness of] our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence." Koivu at 519 
(internal quotations omitted). 
An example of this long-standing jurisprudence is Idaho's adoption of the exclusionary 
rule more than three decades before the U.S. Supreme Court held that it applied to the states. 
State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also State v. 
Conner, 59 Idaho 695 (1939) (stating "[t]he rule is well settled in this state that evidence 
procured in violation of defendant's constitutional immunity from search and seizure, is 
inadmissible and will be excluded if request for its suppression be timely made."). Further, our 
Court went on to reject the U.S. Supreme Court's good-faith exception, which rejection "was 
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supported by an independent exclusionary rule announced eight-five years ago in Arregui." 
Koivu at 519. 
Consistent with Idaho precedent, this court should hold that the Idaho Constitution does 
not tolerate mistakes of law as exceptions to the requirement that an officer have reasonable 
suspension to stop a vehicle. In Koivu, the Idaho Supreme Court issued a thorough analysis of 
our constitution's search and seizure jurisprudence, and a comprehensive recitation of its 
relevant history. 152 Idaho at 513-519. There, the State asked the Court to overrule State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). Guzman had rejected the State's request to apply the "good 
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. In Koivu, the Court provided a synopsis of the 
progression of the exclusionary rule within the U.S. Constitution. Importantly, the Court 
explained that the U.S. Supreme Court's "view of the exclusionary rule ... changed [i]n Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 467 (1976), [where] the Court held that the exclusionary rule 'is not a personal 
constitutional right,' nor is it 'calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the 
search or seizure.'" Koivu at 514. 
The Court then discussed United State v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), which is the case 
our Court declined to follow in Guzman. "In Leon, the police had seized evidence acting in 
reasonable reliance on a search warrant, but the warrant was later determined to have been issued 
without probable cause." Koivu at 514-15. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court "held that the 
exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a 
subsequently invalidated search warrant" because "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter 
police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." Id. ( quotations 
omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the good-faith exception was expanded to 
include reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statues, an arrest pursuant to a "warrant" 
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that the officer had no reason to know was quashed, and searches pursuant to precedents that 
were later overruled. Id. The reason in all of those cases was the same: exclusion would not 
advance the interest in deterring police misconduct. 
However, our Court explained in Koivu that such rationale is not as significant when 
interpreting Idaho's constitution. "In its decision [in State v. Arregui], the [Idaho Supreme] 
Court made it clear that the evidence unlawfully obtained should be excluded simply 
because it was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights." Id. at 516 
( emphasis added). As the Arregui Court stated: 
A continued disregard of the rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
and the principles thereof incorporated in state Constitutions, heads us directly to 
revolution against their usurpation, if history tells us correctly that violation of the rights 
sought to be protected thereby was one of the chief moving reasons for Revolution. If, 
one by one, the rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, can and must, for 
expediency's sake, be violated, abolished, stricken from that immortal document, and 
from state Constitutions, we will find ourselves governed by expediency, not laws or 
Constitutions, and the revolution will have come. 
I can see no such expediency or necessity for the enforcement of any law as to justify 
violation of constitutional rights to accomplish it. The shock to the sensibilities of the 
average citizen when his government violates a constitutional right of another is far 
more evil in its effect than the escape of any criminal through the courts' observance 
of those rights. 
44 Idaho at 58 ( emphasis added). 
This principle was reiterated over a decade later, when the Idaho Supreme Court noted 
that the "rule is well settled in this state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant's 
constitutional immunity from search and seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded if request 
for its suppression be timely made." State v. Connor, 59 Idaho 695, 703 (1939). Again, in 1978, 
the Court held 
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, 
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles 
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established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment 
in the fundamental law of the land. 
State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,393 (1914). Rauch 
and Arregui "held that there were reasons supporting the exclusionary rule other than 
deterring unconstitutional searches and seizures that the law enforcement officers did not 
reasonably believe were lawful." Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518 (emphasis added). Further, "Idaho 
ha[ s] clearly developed an exclusionary rule as a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal 
searches and seizures in addition to other purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the 
exclusionary rule as a deterrent for police misconduct.") Id. at 519 ( quotations omitted). 
The sole basis for the new federal "reasonable mistake of law" exception is that it is 
consistent with the principle that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536 (quotations omitted). The Court added that "[t]o be 
reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the 
part of government officials, giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's 
protection." Id. 
But those federal notions are precisely what our Court has consistently rejected when 
interpreting the Idaho Constitution. If an officer reasonably relies on an invalid warrant, that 
reasonable reliance does not negate the invalidity of the warrant. Idaho's constitution is 
concerned with violations of the constitution, and does not concern itself with "good excuses" 
for violating it. Again, our Court holds that the violation of the constitution "is far more evil in 
its effect than the escape of any criminal." Arregui, supra ( emphasis added). 
Therefore, just as with Idaho's rejection of the good-faith exception, which the U.S. 
Supreme Court held was based on a reasonableness standard, this Court should reject applying 
Heien' s "reasonable mistake of law" exception. 
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In this case, if the traffic stop was effected as a result of a law enforcement officer's 
mistake of law, the invalid stop was not rendered valid by the fact that his mistake was 
reasonable. Therefore, under the Idaho Constitution, Mr. Pettit was illegally seized and all 
resulting evidence is inadmissible. 
2. Even if Heien Applies in Idaho, the Reasonable Mistake of Law Exception 
does not Apply to Defendant's Argument that the Statute is Void for 
Vagueness as Applied to His Conduct. 
An argument that a statute is void for vagueness as to a particular Defendant focuses only 
on the language of the statute as it relates the the Defendant's actions. The law enforcement 
officer's actions are not part of the inquiry. Therefore, whether the officer's actions were 
reasonable mistakes of law is irrelevant. 
As already stated in Defendant's Motion to Suppress, "void for vagueness" is a doctrine 
whereby a statute is declared void either facially, or as applied to a specific defendant's conduct. 
For a successful claim of void for vagueness as applied to a specific defendant's conduct, it must 
be shown that " ... the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific conduct 
was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion 
in determining whether to charge the complainant." Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 748 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2010). In other words, a statute can be declared void for vagueness as applied to a 
specific defendant's conduct if the statute " ... fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary 
intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... " Id. This means that if a statute does not 
enable a regular person to understand whether their actions are appropriate in a specific situation, 
then the statute is void for vagueness as applied to that specific situation. If the statute is void, 
then the defendant's seizure is illegal, and all evidence obtained should be suppressed. 
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This inquiry does not even consider the actions of the officer. It does not matter whether 
the officer made a reasonable mistake of law. The purpose of the void for vagueness doctrine is 
not to punish the misconduct of officers but, rather, to minimize the impact on citizens of poorly 
drafted laws. 
Therefore, the State's "mistake of law" argument based on Heien v. North Carolina is 
inapplicable to Defendant's argument that the statute is void for vagueness as applied to his 
conduct. 
DATED this q<d day of October, 2015. 
McCORMICK LAW OFFICE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the y<f'k day of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the following by courthouse mail: 
Latah County Prosecutor's Office 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-15-1389 
CR-15-1408 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Based on the findings and conclusions announced in open court, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED. All evidence obtained arising 
out of the traffic stop occurring on May 20, 2015, is SUPPRESSED. 
DATED this 1f..J_ d;y of October, 2015, nunc pro tune to October 15, 2015. 
~-"7 
Magistrate Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J Lo*day of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the following by courthouse mail: 
Latah County Prosecutor's Office 
McCormick Law Office 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
ASHLEY S. ROKYTA 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 882-8580 Ext. 3318 
ISBNo. 8491 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2015-1389 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
The State of Idaho, by and through Latah County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Ashley S. Rokyta, submits this Notice of Appeal and hereby appeals the Magistrate 
Judge's Order Granting Motion to Suppress suppressing all evidence obtained arising out 
of the traffic stop on May 20, 2015. This notice of appeal is made pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 54.l(d). 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.4, the State provides the following 
information: 
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(a) The title of the action or proceeding is State of Idaho versus Ivan Drake Pettit. 
(b) The title of the court which heard the proceedings appealed from is the 
Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the 
County of Latah, and the presiding magistrate is the Honorable John C. Judge. 
(c) The number assigned to the action or proceedings by the trial court is Latah 
County Case No. CR-2015-1389. 
(d) The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District, in and for the County of Latah. 
(e) The date of the judgment, decision or order from which the appeal is taken is 
October 16, 2015 (as evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court). (The hearing 
and oral pronouncement of the decision occurred on October 15, 2015) The heading is 
Order Granting Motion to Suppress. 
(f) The appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law. 
(g) The testimony and proceedings in the original hearing were recorded by 
audiotape, which is in the possession of the Clerk of the District Court of Latah County. 
The testimony and hearings were not reported. 
(h) A certificate that the notice of appeal has been served personally or by mailing 
upon the opposing party's attorney and is attached to this notice. 
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(i) The State intends to assert in the appeal that the Magistrate Judge erred in his 
determination that the traffic stop of the Defendant on May 20, 2015 was unconstitutional 
because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. In particular, the Magistrate Judge 
erred by holding that making a right hand turn through a four-way intersection in the 
center lane position from S. Jackson St. to S. Main St. in Moscow, Idaho, also designated as 
southbound U.S. 95 does not require the use of a turn signal under Idaho Code§ 49-808. 
Additionally, the Magistrate Judge erred by holding that if a turn signal is required in this 
circumstance, Idaho Code§ 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the 
Defendant's conduct. Further, the State intends to assert that the Magistrate Judge erred 
in his determination that Idaho Code § 49-808 does not provide notice that a turn signal is 
required at a traffic signal controlled intersection when the only driving maneuver 
allowed is a right hand turn. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2015. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Page -3-
Ashley S. Roka 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL 
was 
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
~ hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Hon. John C. Judge 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Deborah L. McCormick 
McCormick Law Office 
Courthouse Mail 
525 S. Adams St. 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this~ day of October, 2015. 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
ASHLEY S. ROKYT A 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow,Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 882-8580 Ext. 3318 
ISB No. 8491 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2015-1408 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
The State of Idaho, by and through Latah County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Ashley S. Rokyta, submits this Notice of Appeal and hereby appeals the Magistrate 
Judge's Order Granting Motion to Suppress suppressing all evidence obtained arising out 
of the traffic stop on May 20, 2015. This notice of appeal is made pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 54.l(d). 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.4, the State provides the following 
information: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Page -1-
.. 
(a) The title of the action or proceeding is State of Idaho versus Ivan Drake Pettit. 
(b) The title of the court which heard the proceedings appealed from is the 
Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the 
County of Latah, and the presiding magistrate is the Honorable John C. Judge. 
(c) The number assigned to the action or proceedings by the trial court is Latah 
County Case No. CR-2015-1408. 
(d) The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District, in and for the County of Latah. 
(e) The date of the judgment, decision or order from which the appeal is taken is 
October 16, 2015 (as evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court). (The hearing 
and oral pronouncement of the decision occurred on October 15, 2015) The heading is 
Order Granting Motion to Suppress. 
(£) The appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law. 
(g) The testimony and proceedings in the original hearing were recorded by 
audiotape, which is in the possession of the Clerk of the District Court of Latah County. 
The testimony and hearings were not reported. 
(h) A certificate that the notice of appeal has been served personally or by mailing 
upon the opposing party's attorney and is attached to this notice. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Page -2-
000077 
(i) The State intends to assert in the appeal that the Magistrate Judge erred in his 
determination that the traffic stop of the Defendant on May 20, 2015 was unconstitutional 
because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. In particular, the Magistrate Judge 
erred by holding that making a right hand turn through a four-way intersection in the 
center lane position from S. Jackson St. to S. Main St. in Moscow, Idaho, also designated as 
southbound U.S. 95 does not require the use of a turn signal under Idaho Code § 49-808. 
Additionally, the Magistrate Judge erred by holding that if a turn signal is required in this 
circumstance, Idaho Code§ 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the 
Defendant's conduct. Further, the State intends to assert that the Magistrate Judge erred 
in his determination that Idaho Code § 49-808 does not provide notice that a turn signal is 
required at a traffic signal controlled intersection when the only driving maneuver 
allowed is a right hand turn. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2015. 
Ashley S. Rokyt 
Deputy Prosecuting= ney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL 
was 
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
_x_ hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Hon. John C. Judge 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Deborah L. McCormick 
McCormick Law Office 
Courthouse Mail 
525 S. Adams St. 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this~ day of October, 2015. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) Case Nos. CR-2015-1389 & CR-2015-1408 
) 
) NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
) TRANSCRIPT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
NOTICE is hereby given that on November 2, 2015, the transcript in the above 
entitled appeal was lodged with the District Court Clerk and copies thereof hand 
delivered to counsel of record as listed in the Certificate of Service portion of this Notice. 
THE PARTIES ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that they have twenty-one days from 
the date of this notice in which to file any objections to the transcript; upon failure of the 
parties to file any objection within such time period, the transcript shall be deemed 
settled. 
DATED this 2nd day of November 2015. 
Henrianne K. Westberg 
Oerk of the District Court ~· 
~,:;;;;,,,,,_.r 
By~:::;z_~~~~:......:::::~~~~=----
L--,,..--=---s 
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and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
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DEBORAH MCCORMICK 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ASHLEYROKYTA 
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR 
KEITH SCHOLL 
LEGAL INTERN 
on this 2nd day of November 2015. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) Case Nos. CR-2015-1389 & 
) CR-2015-1408 
) 
) 
) ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
) SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING 
) ORALARGUMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
On October 21, 2015, the State filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court. The 
appeal is taken from the Order Granting Motion to Suppress issued by Magistrate 
Judge John C. Judge in the above matters. The transcript of the suppression hearing 
was lodged with this Court on November 2, 2015. Neither party has filed an objection 
to the transcript and therefore, the transcript is now settled in this case. 
Consequently, a briefing schedule is appropriate. 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Page I 
000082 
It is ORDERED that: 
(1) Appellant's opening brief shall be filed and served no later than December 
28, 2015; 
(2) Respondent's response brief shall be filed and served no later than 
January 25, 2016; 
(3) Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served no later than 
February 16, 2016; 
(4) Oral argument will be conducted on February 29, 2016, at 9:30 a.m. 
,rP 
Dated this~ day of December 2015. 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
:#?"~ 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING ORAL 
ARGUMENT were delivered in the following methods to: 
Ashley S. Jennings 
Deputy Prosecutor, Latah County 
Deborah McCormick 
Public Defender, Latah County 
'[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
on this :i ~ay of December 2015. CLERK OF THE COURT 
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SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
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Deborah L. McCormick, ISBN 7223 
McCORMICK LAW OFFICE 
116 E. Third St., Ste. 201 
P.O. Box 10005 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208) 301-9291 
Facsimile: (866) 985-8098 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO,. ) 
) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
Case No. CR-15-1389 
CR-15-1408 
STIPULATION FOR REVISED 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND 
FOR RESCHEDLING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant, by and through Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Ashley Jennings, and 
Respondent, by and through his attorney Deborah L. McCormick, hereby stipulate to 
and request an order for a revised briefing scheduling and rescheduling oral argument 
in this matter. 
The reasons for the stipulation are that, because of the holidays and other 
deadlines and hearings already in other cases, both parties need additional time in 
which to complete their briefs. Therefore, the parties stipulate to and request an order 
for the following revised briefing schedule: 
0 L 
STIPULATION FOR REVISED BRIEFING SCHEDULE - l O O O O 8 5 
1. Appellant's opening brief shall be filed and served no later than January 
11, 2016; 
2. Respondent's response brief shall be filed and served no later February 22, 
2016; 
3. Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served no later than 
March 7, 2016. 
In addition, the parties request an in-person or telephonic scheduling conference 
for purposes of scheduling oral argument. 
Ashley S. Jennis 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
STIPULATION FOR REVISED BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 2 
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Deborah L. McCormi k ~ ~ 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
IVAN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
____________ ) 
Case No. CR-2015-1389 & 
CR-2015-1408 
ORDER DENYING PARTIES' 
STIPULATION FOR REVISED 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
On October 21, 2015, the State filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court. The 
appeal is taken from the Order Granting Motion to Suppress issued by Magistrate 
Judge John C. Judge in the above matters. The transcript of the suppression 
hearing was lodged with this Court on November 2, 2015, and settled on November 
23, 2015. Thereafter, a briefing schedule was set in accordance with Idaho 
Appellate Rule 34(c). 
On December 8, 2015, the parties filed a Stipulation for Revised Briefing 
Schedule and for Rescheduling Oral Argument. The reasons given for the 
Stipulation were the "holidays and other deadlines and hearings already in other 
cases." (Stipulation for Revised Briefing Schedule and for Rescheduling Oral 
ORDER DENYING PARTIES' 
STIPULATION FOR REVISED 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE Page 1 000087 
Argument, p. 1.) However, the parties have not properly complied with Idaho 
Appellate Rule 34(e), which governs requests for time extensions for filing briefs on 
appeal. Additionally, the parties have not made a clear showing of good cause upon 
which an extension should be granted. The events giving rise to this case occurred 
on May 20, 2015. Oral argument under the current schedule is set for February 29, 
2016. If an extension of time were allowed it would result in even further delay. 
Good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED that the parties' Stipulation for Revised Briefing Schedule 
and for Rescheduling Oral Argument is DENIED. 
Dated this IO~ of December 2015. 
ORDER DENYING PARTIES' 
STIPULATION FOR REVISED 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE Page 2 
Jo:fi'n R. Stegner 
District Judge 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Factual Background 
On May 20, 2015, at about 2:23 a.m., Idaho State Police Sergeant Clint Baldwin 
conducted a traffic stop of the Defendant, Ivan Drake Pettit, who was driving a black Toyota 
Corolla for failing to signal a right-tum at the controlled intersection of U.S. 95/S. Jackson St. 
and U.S. 95/S. Main St., in Moscow, Latah County, Idaho. Suppression Hearing ("SH") at 14:13-
20, 15:6-11, 17:22-25, 19: 19-21, 20: 19-22, 21 :2-25. The Defendant was traveling southbound in 
the center lane position on Jackson St. when observed by Sergeant Baldwin. SH at 15:4-11. The 
Defendant approached and entered the intersection while a right green arrow was displayed on 
the traffic signal and failed to signal before making a right-hand tum through the intersection 
onto the S. Main St. portion of U.S. 95. SH at 15:4-11, 21:2-3. Upon contacting the Defendant, 
Sergeant Baldwin determined the Defendant was driving without privileges and was driving 
under the influence of alcohol. 
Procedural Background 
The Defendant was charged with second offense Driving Under the Influence in 
accordance with LC.§ 18-8005(4) and for Driving Without Privileges in accordance with LC.§ 
18-8001. The Defendant pied "not guilty" and moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 
traffic stop. On October 15, 2015 the Honorable John C. Judge heard evidence and oral 
arguments on the matter. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate stated his factual 
findings and conclusions of law on the record, and suppressed the evidence. 
On October 16, 2015 the magistrate signed a written Order Granting Motion to Suppress. 
The State timely appealed on October 21, 2015. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The State raises the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the magistrate err in holding that the traffic stop of the Defendant was not 
supported by reasonable suspicion that the Defendant violated LC. § 49-808(1)? 
2. Did the magistrate err in holding that LC. 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to the Defendant's traffic maneuver in this case? 
3. Did the magistrate err in holding that any potential mistake of law by the officer was 
not objectively reasonable? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Wheeler, 149 
Idaho 364,370,233 (Ct. App. 2010). This Court accepts the findings of fact that are supported 
by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
as found. Id Additionally, both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation 
are questions oflaw over which this Court exercises free review. Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 
41 (Idaho 2010). 
ARGUMENT 
Issue 1 - 1. The magistrate erred in holding that the traffic stop of the Defendant was not 
supported by reasonable suspicion that the Defendant violated J.C. § 49-808(1). 
Sergeant Baldwin conducted a lawful traffic stop and DUI investigation of the Defendant 
in accordance with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Art. I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer is justified in 
stopping a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if articulable facts known to the 
officer give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); State v. 
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Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932 (1992). Whether reasonable suspicion existed is determined by 
looking at the totality of the circumstances and the facts available to the officer at the moment of 
the seizure. State v Dewbre, 133 Idaho 559,661 (Ct. App. 1996). Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. 
State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The Defendant was in violation of LC. § 49-808(1) for failing to signal when turning a 
vehicle through an intersection and onto a highway. LC. § 49-808(1) states when a driver is 
required to signal, as follows: 
No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway 
unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety 
nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
LC. § 49-808(2) states how a driver must signal when required: 
A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required 
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-
access highways and before turning from a parked position, the 
signal shall be given for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all 
other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet 
traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
This Court need only determine if the right green arrow at a traffic-controlled intersection 
requires a tum, which according to the LC § 49-808(2) drivers are required to signal 
continuously the last 100 feet traveled before turning. 
Additionally, Idaho Code§ 49-801(1) states: 
The driver of any vehicle shaH obey the instructions of any traffic-
control device placed or held in accordance with the provisions of 
this title, unless otherwise directed by a peace officer, subject to 
the exceptions granted the driver of an authorized emergency 
vehicle by this title. 
Idaho code § 49-802(1 )(b) explains what a motorist must do on at a green 
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arrow signal at a traffic-control device: 
A driver facing a green arrow signal, shown alone or in 
combination with another indication, shall enter the intersection 
only to make the movement indicated by the green arrow, or other 
movement that is permitted by other indications shown at the same 
time. 
According to LC. § 49-802(1 )(b ), drivers facing a right green arrow are necessarily 
entering an intersection as defined by LC. § 49-11 0(IO)(a): 
The area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the 
lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the 
roadways of two (2) highways which join one another at, right 
angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different 
highways joining at any other angle may come into conflict. 
In this case, the green arrow signal from the Defendant's center lane position on the 
Jackson St. portion of U.S 95 South controlled the Defendant's driving at the intersection. The 
Defendant failed to signal continuously the last 100 feet before the intersection as required by 
LC§ 49-808(2). Regardless of the U.S 95 designation, the City of Moscow has designated this 
portion of U.S. 95 as S. Jackson St. and S. Main St. at this intersection. The State ofldaho has 
also designated a portion of S. Jackson St. as Highway 8. The separate designated highway 
names by the City of Moscow and the State of Idaho at this four-way intersection, coupled with 
the traffic control device, indicate that a driver is necessarily turning into an intersection from 
one highway onto another highway as defined by LC. § 49-1 IO(I0)(a). LC.§ 49-808 applies 
under these circumstances because the Defendant was turning onto a highway. Sergeant 
Baldwin witnessed the Defendant's failure to use a signal at the intersection and conducted a 
traffic stop. 
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Issue 2 - The magistrate erred in holding that I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to the Defendant's conduct requiring suppression of all evidence obtained after the 
traffic stop. 
At the suppression hearing, the Defendant argued that LC. § 49-808 was void for 
vagueness as applied to the Defendant's conduct because the Defendant was travelling on U.S. 
95 South and was simply following a "bend in the road" that does not require a turning signal. 
A statute may be void for vagueness, premised on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. State v. Burton, 149 Idaho 746, 748 (Ct. 
App. 2010). In Burton, the defendant was driving on a highway when her lane of travel 
expanded to include a passing lane. Id. at 747. The defendant passed a posted traffic sign 
indicating "that the lanes merged," but did not signal as "she approached the end of the double 
lane expanse" and was stopped by a police officer for violating LC. § 49-808. Id. The Court held 
that the statute was vague as applied to the defendant's driving because the statute did not 
specify "how much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to trigger the duty 
to signal" and it is not apparent from the language of I.C. § 49-808(1) "whether a signal is 
required when two lanes blend into one." Id. at 749. 
In contrast, signaling is required where adequately posted traffic signs provide fair notice 
to drivers. State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881,883 (Ct. App. 2014). In Colvin, the defendant was 
driving in the right-hand lane along a multi-lane highway. Id. at 882. After passing a posted 
traffic sign on the highway that indicated that the right-hand lane merged into the left lane, the 
defendant failed to signal in the area where the two lanes converged into one. Id. The defendant 
argued that I.C. § 49-808 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct because the 
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road configuration was analogous to the merging lanes in Burton. Id. at 883. The court held the 
posted traffic sign in this case provided fair notice to the defendant that "his lane ended and that 
under the statute he was required to signal." Id. at 884-85. 
In this case, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because the Defendant was 
provided fair notice that a right tum traffic maneuver was required at the intersection of U.S. 
95/S. Jackson St. and U.S. 95/S. Main St from the posted signs and the right green arrow traffic 
control device. Similar to the defendant in Colvin, State's Exhibits 1-4 show the posted traffic 
signs that the Defendant passed before reaching the intersection. State's Exhibit 7 shows the 
right green arrow traffic control device at the intersection that was showing when the Defendant 
approached and went through the intersection. Unlike the posted traffic sign in Burton, where 
the traffic sign was ambiguous as to which lane ended and which lane continued, the Defendant 
in our case passed by two separate "Advance Route Turn" notifications with two separate 
"Advance Tum Arrow Auxiliary Signs" indicating that a right-tum was required in order to 
continue driving on U.S. 95. Because the Defendant was provided fair notice that a turn was 
required in order to continue driving along U.S. 95 at the intersection, the magistrate erred in 
determining that I.C. § 49-808 was void for vagueness as applied to the Defendant's conduct. 
Issue 3 - The magistrate erred in holding that any potential mistake of law by the officer 
was not objectively reasonable. 
Alternatively, should this Court find I.C. § 49-808 does not require the Defendant to 
signal or is vague as to the Defendant's conduct, Sergeant Baldwin's interpretation of the Idaho 
Code was an objectively reasonable mistake of law and thus still gives rise to the reasonable 
suspicion required to conduct a traffic stop. 
Reasonable suspicion can rest on a reasonable mistake of law. Heien v. North Carolina, 
135 S. Ct. 530, 538 (2014). In Heien, the defendant was pulled over by a police officer for 
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having only one functioning brake light. Id at 534-35. Two North Carolina statutes were 
interpreted by North Carolina courts indicating that only one brake light was required, but it was 
objectively reasonable for an officer to think that all rear lamps of a vehicle were required to be 
functioning. Id. at 540. The "stop lamp" provision of the North Carolina statute had never been 
interpreted by North Carolina courts. Id. The Court held that when an officer conducts a traffic 
stop and the reasonable suspicion for the stop was based on a mistake of law, the reasonable 
suspicion justifying the stop remains, so long as the officer's mistake of law was objectively 
reasonable. Id at 540. The Court also noted, " ... just because mistakes oflaw cannot justify the 
imposition or the avoidance of criminal liability, it does not follow that they cannot justify an 
investigatory stop." Id. 
Even if this court finds that the statute is vague as to the Defendant's conduct under LC. § 
49-808(1 ), Sergeant Baldwin made a reasonable mistake oflaw because the Defendant 
approached a traffic-controlled intersection and the right green arrow indicates to drivers that 
they are to make a right-hand turn when entering the intersection as required by I.C. § 49-
802(1 )(b ). Similar to the brake light statute in Heien, I. C. § 49-808 has not yet been interpreted 
to include or exclude turns that require, by traffic-controlled signal, a turn from one highway to 
another portion of the highway in which both highways maintain a separate state highway 
designation as well as a similar federal designation. Therefore, it is a reasonable interpretation of 
law for an officer to believe that a driver failing to signal before making a right-hand turn at a 
traffic-controlled intersection has violated Title 49 of the Idaho Code. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the magistrate court's ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION TO SUPRESS and remand for further proceedings. 
Dated this d'81day of December, 2015. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Factual Background 
On May 20, 2015, the Respondent, Ivan Drake Pettit, was stopped while driving his 
vehicle by Idaho State Police Sergeant Clint A. Baldwin for failing to use his turn signal while 
travelling along U.S. Highway 95 South in Moscow, Idaho. Specifically, Respondent was 
travelling in the center of three lanes on State Highway 8/U.S. Highway 95 South/South Jackson 
Street. As you approach the intersection commonly known as the "south couplet", the left lane is 
marked for continuing on Highway 8, while the center and right lanes are marked for continuing 
on U.S. Highway 95 South. Respondent remained in his lane of travel as he continued through 
the intersection. He remained in his lane of travel and, therefore, did not activate a signal to 
indicate intention to move right or left upon U.S. Highway 95 South. As he rounded the bend in 
U.S. Highway 95 South, he was continuing on U.S. 95 South and, therefore, did not activate a 
signal to indicate he was entering or exiting a Highway. Sgt. Clint A. Baldwin stopped 
Defendant for failure to signal and subsequently a1Tested him for Driving Under the Influence 
and cited him for Driving Without Privileges. 
Procedural Background 
On May 20, 2015, Respondent was charged with a violation Idaho Code§ 18-8004 (l)(a) 
Driving Under the Influence - (Second Offense). Respondent pled not guilty to this charge and 
on September 8, 2015 moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the unlawful traffic stop 
conducted by Sgt. Baldwin. On October 15, 2015, evidence and oral argument was presented to 
the presiding Magistrate Judge, Honorable John C. Judge. After having received the evidence 
and oral argument for his consideration, the Magistrate stated his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, on the record, and granted Respondent's Motion to Suppress based upon his 
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decisions that 1) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop; 2) LC. § 49-808 is void for 
vagueness as applied to Respondent's conduct; and 3) because the statute clearly did not apply to 
this set of circumstances, the officer's mistake of law was not reasonable. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND RESPONSES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Appellant raises the following three issues on appeal and Respondent responds as 
follows: 
A. Did the Magistrate err in holding that the traffic stop of the Defendant was not supported 
by reasonable suspicion that the Defendant violated LC. § 49-808(1)? 
1. The Magistrate correctly held that the traffic stop was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion because the plain language of J.C.§ 49-808(1) does not 
require the use of a signal in this particular situation. 
B. Did the magistrate err in holding that LC. 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to the Defendant's traffic maneuver in this case? 
2. The Magistrate correctly held that J.C.§ 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to the Defendant/Respondent because it does not give fair notice to a 
person of ordinary intelligence that a turn signal is required when maintaining 
their lane of travel and continuing on the same Highway. 
C. Did the Magistrate err in holding that any potential mistake of law by the officer was not 
objectively reasonable? 
3. The Beien reasonable mistake of law exception is inapplicable to the argument 
that the statute is void for vagueness as applied to Respondent's conduct. 
4. The Magistrate correctly held that J.C.§ 49-808(1) is clear on its face and, 
therefore, it was not objectively reasonable for the officer to apply the statute in 
these circumstances. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard ofreview on an order suppressing evidence is two-fold. First, the reviewing 
court accepts the lower court's findings of fact as long as they are supported by substantial 
evidence. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364,370 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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Second, the reviewing court has free review over statutory interpretation and the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts. Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40 (Idaho 
2010). 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF FACTS 
The Magistrate Judge's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and, 
therefore, must be accepted by the reviewing court. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 3 70 (Ct. 
App. 2010). 
After reviewing the exhibits submitted by both parties, as well as the testimony of Sgt. 
Baldwin, the Magistrate Judge stated: 
And based on my interpretation of the evidence, uh, Mr. Pettit was in the middle lane, 
there was nowhere else for him to go. All he had to do was maintain that lane. All-- the 
only direction-- and this was-- and in looking at all the signs, the only direction he could 
go was around the bend of that curve. He had no other options. He was not moving right 
or left on the Highway. He-- he was not-- he was not uh turning onto a new Highway, 
because if you look at Exhibit B, it's Ninety-five all the way down. That's what it says, 
Ninety-five all the way to North Main, Jackson, uh, south onto the Highway. It's just 
continues. It's continuous. So he's not turning onto another Highway. 
Suppression Hearing Transcr. 78:17 -79:8 (hereafter referred to "SH Transcr."). 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Magistrate correctly held that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion because the plain language ofI.C. § 49-808(1) does not require the use of a 
signal in this particular situation. 
This issue raised by Appellant is a question of statutory interpretation. (SH Transcr. at 
69:11.7-9). In regards to statutory construction "[t]he plain, obvious and rational meaning is 
always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational meaning. State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 
40 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998). I.C. § 49-808(1) is clear on its face regarding the type of movement 
that requires the use of a tum signal. Respondent's traffic maneuver in this case was not one 
which required the use of a tum signal. 
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Non-use of a turn signal at this intersection is the only basis for argument regarding whether 
there was reasonable suspicion for this stop. During oral argument on Respondent's Motion to 
Suppress, Sgt. Baldwin testified that the traffic arrow was green, that he observed no other 
driving pattern to warrant a stop, and that he pulled Respondent over for simply not using his 
turn signal. (SH Transcr. 18:12-20; 25:10-13; 28:11-22.) Exhibits submitted demonstrate that 
Respondent could not go any direction other than around the bend in the Highway. (SH Transcr. 
78:17 - 79:1.) 
I.C. § 49-808(1) states: 
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a Highway or move a vehicle right or left 
upon a Highway or merge onto or exit from a Highway unless and until the 
movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate 
signal. 
The plain, obvious, and rational meaning is that a person must use the appropriate signal 
when turning a vehicle onto a Highway, moving right or left upon a Highway, or merging 
onto or exiting from a Highway. Respondent was executing none of these traffic maneuvers. 
During arguments below, Appellant conceded that this was not a question of "moving right or 
left upon a Highway", which referred to lane changes. (SH Transcr. 47:2-11.) Appellant 
conceded that the issue was whether Respondent had turned onto a Highway or merged onto or 
exited a Highway within the meaning of the statute. (SH Transcr. 46:2-47:11.) As found by 
the Magistrate Judge: 
" ... Mr.Pettit was in the middle lane, there was nowhere else for him to go. All 
he had to do was maintain that lane. All-- the only direction-- and this was--
and in looking at all the signs, the only direction he could go was around the bend 
of that curve. He had no other options. He was not moving right or left on the 
Highway. He-- he was not-- he was not uh turning onto a new Highway ... " 
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(SH Transcr. 78: 17 - 79:3). Therefore, because Respondent was neither turning onto a Highway, 
moving left or right upon a Highway, or merging onto or exiting from a Highway, the officer did 
not have reasonable suspicion that a violation of I.C. § 49-808(1) had occurred. 
However, it would be remiss to end the discussion without first addressing the various other 
statutes Appellant uses in an attempt to bolster its argument. First, Appellant cites to I.C. § 49-
808(2) which states: 
A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall be given 
continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access Highways and before 
turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less 
than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one 
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
(Emphasis added.) This section of the statute states the manner in which a turn signal is to be 
used; however, it does not set forth any additional traffic maneuvers to which I.C. §49-808(1) 
applies. 
Next, Appellant cites to I.C. § 49-801(1) which states: 
The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any traffic-control device 
placed or held in accordance with the provisions of this title, unless otherwise 
directed by a peace officer, subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an 
authorized emergency vehicle by this title. 
This section does not give any instructions as to when a signal is required. Rather, this section 
merely states that, with limited exception, drivers must obey instructions of traffic-control 
devices, which is precisely what Respondent did. He maintained his lane of travel in the center 
lane, and followed the signage, around a bend in U.S. Highway 95 South, to continue his route 
along U.S. Highway 95 South. As Sgt. Baldwin testified, he did not change lanes and did not 
even swerve within his own lane. 
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Next, Appellant cites to I.C. § 49-802(1)(b) which states: 
A driver facing a green arrow signal, shown alone or in combination with another 
indication, shall enter the intersection only to make the movement indicated by 
the green arrow, or other movement that is permitted by other indications shown 
at the same time. A driver facing a left turn green arrow shall yield the right-of-
way to other traffic and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection or an 
adjacent crosswalk. 
This statute states that once a driver enters an intersection that is controlled by a green arrow 
signal the only lawful movement is that indicated by the green arrow signal. Again, this statute 
provides no further instructions on when a signal is required. The record clearly demonstrates 
that Respondent did not violate this statute nor has Appellant ever made that argument. Rather, 
Appellant uses these statutes in an attempt to hide the circularity of it's argument. 
Appellant's argument is that since drivers facing a green arrow signal are necessarily entering 
an intersection, then by virtue of I.C. § 49-808(2) that driver must signal. However, the 
Appellant is unable to point to a statute that states drivers must necessarily use a turn signal 
merely predicated upon entering an intersection. Instead, what Appellant does state is that " ... the 
green arrow signal from the Defendant's center lane position on the Jackson St. portion of U.S. 
Highway 95 South controlled the Defendant's driving at the intersection." (Appellants Br. at 
6:para.2 (emphasis added)). This is true. The green arrow signal controlled Respondent's ability 
to make traffic maneuvers. Accordingly, reading I.C. § 49-801 (1) and 802(1 )(b) together a driver 
must obey the instructions of a traffic control device, and if that traffic control device is a green 
arrow signal then once entering the intersection, he must only make the movement indicated by 
the green arrow. However, neither statute states that he must make use of a turn signal when 
doing so. Further, LC.§ 49-808(2) states "[a] signal of intention to turn or move right or left 
when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic." By the very language of the 
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statute, there are situations in which a signal is not required and that to which the statute does not 
apply. 
As found by the Magistrate Judge, Respondent was travelling on U.S. Highway 95 South and 
merely continued in his same lane on U.S. Highway 95 South. He did not move left or right 
upon the Highway, and he did not enter or exit the Highway. Rather, he continued on his way 
around a bend in the Highway. Therefore, because LC.§ 49-808, nor any other statute cited by 
Appellant, requires a signal in the situation presented here, the officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop Respondent, and the stop violated both the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution. 
2. The Magistrate correctly held that I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to the Defendant/Respondent because it does not give fair notice to a person 
of ordinary intelligence that a signal is required when maintaining their lane of 
travel on continuing on the same highway. 
If the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of LC. § 49-808(1) is applied to hold that 
Respondent was in violation of this statute, it would violate the Respondent's right to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, 
§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The theory of due process of law at issue in this case is one of basic fairness. Specifically, it 
is a requirement " ... that all " ... be informed as to what the State commands or forbids ... " and 
that" ... men of common intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law." 
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 748 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010), (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
566, 574 (1974)). 
The void for vagueness doctrine is a doctrine whereby a statute is declared void either 
facially, or as applied to a specific defendant's conduct. For a successful claim of void for 
vagueness as applied to a specific defendant's conduct, it must be shown that " ... the statute 
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failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific conduct was prohibited or failed to 
provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to 
charge the complainant." Id at 748. In other words, a statute can be declared void for vagueness 
as applied to a specific defendant's conduct if the statute " ... fails to give adequate notice to 
people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... " Id. This means that if a 
statute does not enable a regular person to understand whether their actions are appropriate in a 
specific situation, then the statute is void for vagueness as applied to that situation. 
This is not the first time that the requirements ofl.C. § 49-808(1) have been analyzed by 
Idaho Courts. In State v. Dewbre the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this statute applying an 
analysis based on implications of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. In that case the defendant was travelling on Highway 57 in Bonner County 
when he was stopped for violating the signal requirement ofl.C. § 49-808(1). State v. Dewbre, 
133 Idaho 663,664 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999). The particular section of the Highway in the direction 
where the defendant was travelling had changed from one lane to two lanes, which was signed to 
keep right accept to pass. Id. At the end of the passing lane were more signs that indicated that 
the right lane was coming to an end and directed motorists to merge left. Id. The defendant 
entered the right lane and continued in that lane until the lane merged into the left hand lane. 
When the lane merged into the left hand lane the defendant merged without using his tum signal. 
Id. The defendant was stopped and eventually charged with Driving Under the Influence. Id. 
In that case, the Court did not address the argument regarding whether the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because the issue was not raised prior to the appeal. Id at 667. However, 
the Court did find that the defendant was required to use his signal to indicate his specific 
movement upon the Highway. Id. This was because the Court found that the defendant had 
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" ... moved his vehicle to the right ... " when he entered the right lane, and when the right lane 
ended and the defendant merged back into the left lane it "required a turning movement to the 
left." Id. at 666 (emphasis in the original). It is important to note that no opinion in this case, 
which was decided by a three judge panel, commanded a majority opinion. In his concurring 
opinion Judge Schwartzman stated, " ... many an Idaho driver would, in custom and practice, see 
no need to operate a turn signal in this hyper-technical situation." Id at 667 (Schwartzman J. 
concurring in the result). Furthem1ore, In Judge McDermott's dissenting opinion he cautioned: 
Judicial interpretation of a statute should 'aim to give it sensible construction' 
such as will effectuate legislative intent while, if possible, avoiding an absurd 
conclusion." Requiring a driver to signal when he or she is traveling in 
essentially a straight line, and as required by the posted signs, may confuse, 
rather than alert, other drivers. 
Id. at 668, (McDermott J. Dissenting), (citing Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1988)). Thus, the court in Dewbre acknowledged lateral movement upon a Highway places 
an individual under the ambit of the statute. However, in its concurring opinion, the court 
admitted that signaling in these types of situations could result in confusion to other potential 
motorists. 
In Burton the Idaho Court of Appeals once again addressed LC. § 49-808(1 ). This time the 
Court directly dealt with the issue of whether LC.§ 49-808(1) was void for vagueness as applied 
to a particular defendant. Ultimately, the Court held that LC.§ 49-808(1) was unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to the defendant. Burton, 149 Idaho at 750. 
Interestingly, the facts leading up to the stop were virtually identical to the facts in Dewbre. 
The defendant, Burton, was driving when she approached an expansion of lanes in her direction 
of travel, signed for the purposes of passing. Id at 747 Burton remained in the right hand lane 
until the double lanes were about to end, which was signed that the lanes merged, and she did not 
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signal at the point of the terminus of the right hand lane. Id. She was subsequently stopped by a 
law enforcement officer and investigated for Driving Under the Influence. Id. 
On appeal, the Burton argued that "[t]he statute does not give notice ... that such continued 
forward movement constitutes "moving" a vehicle "right or left upon a Highway."" Id at 749. In 
its decision, the court stated that the statute was void for vagueness as applied because " ... the 
statute does not specify how much or what type of movement to the left or right is necessary to 
trigger the duty to signal." Id. The court went on to state that: 
... the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly literal application to every 
type of side to side movement, for a vehicle literally moves to the left or the 
right when a driver weaves a bit within his or her lane or simply negotiates a 
bend in the road, but no one would contend that a signal is required in those 
instances. 
Id. (emphasis added). In short, the Court in Burton found that LC. § 49-808(1) was void for 
vagueness as applied to the defendant because it would be guesswork for people of ordinary 
intelligence to attempt to determine whether they were required to use a turn signal when faced 
with that particular factual scenario. 
LC. § 49-808(1) is void for vagueness as applied to the Respondent because it does not give 
fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that a tum signal is required when maintaining 
your lane of travel and continuing on the same Highway. Unlike the defendant in Dewbre, 
Respondent did not change lanes (i.e., he made no lateral left or right movement upon U.S. 
Highway 95 South). Further, Respondent merely continued his forward direction on the same 
Highway. His movement was akin to rounding a curve in a road, albeit a curve precipitated by a 
traffic control device and signage indicating the curve in U.S. Highway 95 South. 
As for signage, Appellant argues that the four notifications that indicate that two lanes 
continue south U.S. Highway 95 South somehow informs a driver that a signal is required for 
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them to continue on the same Highway. However, nothing on the signage states a signal is 
required. Rather, the signage, much like the green arrow signal, merely indicates which lanes a 
driver should use if they wish to continue on U.S. Highway 95 South. 
As the Court cautioned in Burton, it is impractical to literally interpret the statute whenever a 
vehicle moves laterally. Respondent's movement in this case is comparable to rounding a bend 
in a road. Further, as suggested by the Magistrate Judge, a signal in this situation could be 
confusing to other drivers who may be expecting the signaling party to change lanes. (SH 
Transcr. 34:6-8; 38:5-10; 64:2-11.) 
Therefore, because LC. § 49-808(1) does not give fair notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that a tum signal is required when maintaining the same lane of travel and 
continuing on the same Highway, it is void for vagueness as applied to Respondent's conduct in 
this case. 
3. The Heien reasonable mistake of law exception is inapplicable to the argument that 
the statute is void for vagueness as applied to Respondent's conduct. 
Appellant argues that, should this court find that LC. § 49-808 is void for vagueness as to 
Respondent's conduct, the traffic stop is valid based upon an objectively reasonable mistake of 
law by the officer. (Appellant's Br. 8, para. 2) However, an argument that a statute is void for 
vagueness as to a particular Defendant focuses only on the language of the statute as it relates to 
the Defendant's actions. The law enforcement officer's actions are not part of the inquiry. 
Therefore, whether the officer's actions were reasonable mistakes of law is irrelevant. 
As already stated, "void for vagueness" is a doctrine whereby a statute is declared void either 
facially, or as applied to a specific defendant's conduct. For a successful claim of void for 
vagueness as applied to a specific defendant 's conduct, it must be shown that " ... the statute failed 
to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide 
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sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge 
the complainant." Burton, 149 Idaho at 748. In other words, a statute can be declared void for 
vagueness as applied to a specific defendant's conduct if the statute " ... fails to give adequate 
notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... " Id. This means 
that if a statute does not enable a regular person to understand whether their actions are 
appropriate in a specific situation, then the statute is void.for vagueness as applied to that 
specific situation. If the statute is void, then the defendant 's seizure is illegal, and all evidence 
obtained should be suppressed. 
This inquiry does not even consider the actions of the officer. The purpose of the void for 
vagueness doctrine is not to punish the misconduct of officers but, rather, to minimize the impact 
on citizens of poorly drafted laws. Therefore, Appellant's "mistake oflaw" argument based on 
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. __ , 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) is inapplicable to whether the 
statute is void for vagueness as applied to Respondent's conduct. 
4. The Magistrate correctly held that I.C. § 49-808(1) is clear on its face and, therefore, 
it was not objectively reasonable for the officer to apply the statute in these 
circumstances. 
Appellant argues the Magistrate erred when deciding that Sgt. Baldwin's interpretation of the 
Idaho Code was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law. Appellant rests this argument on 
two assertions. First, via LC. § 49-802(1)(b), that the right green arrow traffic-control device 
required a right turn that necessitates the use of a tum signal. As set forth in Respondent's first 
argument, LC.§ 49-802(1)(b) provides no instructions on when a signal is required. In addition, 
this section of U.S. Highway 95 South is more akin to a bend in the road. As the Magistrate 
Judge stated, " ... the only direction he could go was around the bend of that curve. He had no 
other options. He was not moving right or left on the Highway." (SH Transcr. at 78:21 - 79:2.) 
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Second, Appellant argues that the statute at issue in Heien is similar to I.C. § 49-808 in that 
LC. § 49-808 has yet to be interpreted regarding the particular traffic maneuver executed by 
Respondent which is at issue in this case. This is trne; however, that is not the relevant question. 
As stated by the Magistrate Judge, Heien's application "is very limited." (SH Transcr. 76:3-5.) 
The relevant question is not whether the court has interpreted the statute before under a particular 
set of facts but is, as voiced by Justice Kagan in the Concurring Opinion, whether the" ... statute 
is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer's judgment requires hard interpretive 
work ... " Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541. As Justice Kagan pointed out, and the Magistrate Judge in this 
case reiterated, " ... the Solicitor General made the point at oral argument, the statute must pose a 
"really difficult" or "very hard question of statutory interpretation." Id., see also SH Transcr. at 
80:7-8. Further, "North Carolina and the Solicitor General agreed that such cases will be 
exceedingly rare." Id., see also SH Transcr. 80:9-11 (internal quotes omitted). The statute in 
Heien did pose that type of difficult statutory interpretation. As Justice Kagan explains: 
[T]he statute requires every car on the Highway to have "a stop lamp," in the 
singular. But the statute goes on to state that a stop lamp (or, in more modern 
terminology, brake light) "may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other 
rear lamps," suggesting that a stop lamp itself qualifies as a rear lamp. Il;,id. 
(emphasis added). And the statute further mandates that every car have "all 
originally equipped rear lamps ... in good working order." The North Carolina 
Court of Appeals dealt with the statute's conflicting signals in one way (deciding 
that a brake light is not a rear lamp, and so only one needs to work); but a court 
could easily take the officer's view ( deciding that a brake light is a rear lamp, and 
if a car comes equipped with more than one, as modem cars do, all must be in 
working order). 
Id at 541-542 (internal citations omitted). In contrast to the statute at issue in Heien, I.C. § 49-
808 is unambiguous and does not require hard interpretative work to overturn Sgt. Baldwin's 
decision. 
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In particular, J.C.§ 49-808(1) contains three unambiguous mandates. One, use your turn 
signal when turning a vehicle onto a Highway. Two, use your turn signal when moving right or 
left on the Highway. Third, use your turn signal to merge onto or exit from a Highway. 
Respondent was on U.S. Highway 95 South both before and after he went through the traffic-
control device at issue. Respondent did not move left or right upon U.S. Highway 95 South 
before or after he went through the traffic-control device, but rather maintained his lane of travel. 
He did not turn onto a Highway or merge or exit from a Highway because he was continuing on 
the same Highway. Therefore, since Respondent violated none of the clear and unambiguous 
mandates ofI.C. § 49-808(1) the Magistrate Judge correctly held that a mistake oflaw by the 
officer was not objectively reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent requests that this Court AFFIRM the Magistrate 
Court's Order Granting Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this f).5'<M.,, day of January, 2016. 
McCORMICK LAW OFFICE 
~~--:a;:: ..... :._ ___ 
Travis D. Spears 
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I hereby certify that on the {)5!0-: day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the following by courthouse mail: 
Latah County Prosecutor's Office 
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The State of Idaho, by and through Ashley S. Jennings, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, 
and Keith Scholl, Legal Intern, hereby replies to the Respondent's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Magistrate Judge's findings of fact about the character of the highway in this 
case were not supported by substantial evidence because Exhibit B does not show the full 
highway name designations. 
This Court can only rely on the Magistrate's findings of fact at the Suppression Hearing 
if the facts were supported by substantial evidence. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364,370 (Ct. 
App. 2010). The Magistrate relied on Exhibit B for his findings of fact at th~ Suppression 
Hearing that the Defendant was not turning onto a highway by stating: 
"He- - he was not - - he was not uh turning onto a new highway, 
because if you look at Exhibit B, its Ninety-five all the way down. 
That's what it says, Ninety-five all the way to North Main, Jackson, 
uh, south onto the highway. It's just continuous. So he's not turning 
onto another highway." 
Suppression Hearing ("SH") at 67: 14-19. The Magistrate erred by not taking into account the 
testimony of Sgt. Baldwin about the change in designation of the highways at the South Main 
Couplet intersection: 
Q (by the state) What happened at about two twenty three A.M. ? 
A (by Sgt. Baldwin) Uhm, I was southbound uhm on Jackson, at the South Main couplet 
and umh approaching the uhm Highway Eight/Highway Ninety-five intersection, and 
uhm I saw a car in front of me. 
SH at 15:4-6. 
Q (by the state) Now, uhm, you testified earlier that your location was at this South Main 
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couplet, South Jackson Street. What other Street - - what other - - are there any other 
names that the street is known by, that highway is known by? 
A (Sgt. Baldwin) Yeah. Its uhm - - it - - it's essentially an area where Jackson Street and 
U.S. Ninety-five southbound and uh Highway Eight eastbound all kind of overlap for uh 
a short distance. 
SH at 20:14-22. 
Exhibit B is a zoomed out image from Google Maps that does not show the full highway 
name designations. At the Suppression Hearing, the intent of the parties was to allow the 
Magistrate access to Defense Counsel's computer so that the Magistrate could see more thanjust 
Exhibit B, but also the zoomed in version of this section of Moscow, Idaho and Google Earth 
images of the route taken by the Defendant. SH at 9: 10-12:3. The State requests that this Court 
take judicial notice of the highway name designations, pursuant to I.RE. 201, that after turning 
right at the intersection in this case, a motorist is no longer on any portion of HWY 8. In 
addition, the State requests that judicial notice be taken that southbound U.S. Route 95 continues 
through the intersection at issue in this case. 1 
2. The State is not arguing that drivers must necessarily use a turn signal merely 
predicated upon entering intersections, rather, the State argues that the traffic signal at 
this intersection provides notice to Idaho drivers that a turn is required at thi~ intersection, 
and thus, a turn signal is required. 
The State provided to this Court in its Appellant's Brief various statutes that apply to 
motorists in the State ofldaho. The statutes cited in the Appellant's Brief provide the premises 
for a sound logical argument that the location in question is an intersection, that the Defendant 
1 Pursuant to I.R.E.201, the State requests that this Court take judicial notice that U.S. Route 95 is a north-south 
highway near the western border of the state, stretching from Oregon to British Columbia for over 538 miles. 
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was required to tum right through the intersection while in his lane of travel, and that the 
character of the highway changed making it a separate and distinct highway triggering the tum 
signaling duties of LC. § 49-808. 
When one highway ends, and another highway begins at an angle, through an 
intersection, a tum signal is required by I.C. 808(1 ). State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 270 (Ct. 
App. 1998). In Pressley, a defendant motorist was travelling northbound on a highway in 
Pocatello, Idaho and approached an intersection controlled by stops signs Id. at 278. The 
highway the defendant was traveling on came to an end at the intersection. Id. The defendant in 
that ca_se was faced with three possible traffic maneuvers: (1) a ninety-degree right hand tum, (2) 
a forty-degree right hand tum, and (3) a 140-degree left-hand tum. Id. The defendant was 
stopped by a police officer after taking the forty-degree right hand tum for failing to signal in 
violation of I.C. § 49-808(1), and subsequently arrested for DUI. Id. at 277. The defendant in that 
case argued that the forty-degree traffic maneuver was essentially going straight through the . 
intersection and a signal of intention to tum right would have indicated to other motorists that her 
intention was to _take the ninety-degree right hand tum and thus, was not in violation of I.C. § 49-
808( 1 ). Id. at 277-78. The court held that the defendant committed an infraction, justifying the 
traffic stop, when the defendant proceeded through the intersection without signaling her 
intention to tum onto the "less sharp" of the two right-hand turns because the street name 
designations had changed. Id. at 279. The court also noted that I.C. § 49-808 does not provide 
exceptions for situations in which more than one traffic maneuver can be made by a tum signal. 
Id. 
Here, the Defendant's traffic maneuver was also a right-hand tum through an intersection 
in which the highway name designation changes. Specifically, once a right-hand tum is made 
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through the intersection in our case, HWY 8 no longer is part of the highway designation. 
Respondent's brief characterizes the right-hand tum at the intersection in our case as a "bend in 
the road" along the same highway. However, a more accurate description would be calling the 
traffic maneuver a ninety-degree right-hand tum through an intersection in which the designation 
of the highway changes. As the court in Pressley found, it is not of significant consequence that 
the angle of tum was akin to going straight through the intersection, or straighter than other 
potential turns at other intersections. The significant fact in Pressley was that a traffic maneuver 
through an intersection that requires even a forty-degree angle tum is enough to trigger the tum 
signal requirements of I. C. § 49-808, so long as the designation of the highway changes. In our 
case, the sweeping right-hand tum from the middle lane position at the South Main Couplet is 
close to a ninety-degree tum, certainly greater than a forty-degree tum. Further, a motorist, upon 
entering the intersection and turning right, is no longer on any portion of HWY 8. 
3. The factual distinctions between the cases cited by the Respondent in their void for 
vagueness as applied challenge to I.C. § 49-808 and our case are significant. 
The Defendant incorrectly argues that this Court should apply the void for vagueness 
doctrine as applied to the Defendant's conduct in our case. The Defendant is correct in that there 
are two potential circumstances in which a void for vagueness challenge can be raised and 
applied to a statute. A statute can be void for vagueness if (1) that statue itself is facially vague or 
(2) the statue is void for vagueness as applied to a specific defendant's conduct. State v. Burton, 
149 Idaho 746, 748 (Ct. App. 2010). The Defendant does not argue that the LC.§ 49-808 is 
facially void, but argues that LC. § 49-808 is void for vagueness as applied because a person of 
ordinary intelligence has not been given fair notice that a tum signal is required under the factual 
scenario of our case. 
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The Defendant relies on the Dewbre and Burton as examples of when notice has been 
found to be sufficient or insufficient for an "as applied" challenge to LC. § 49-808 when it comes 
to movements left or right upon a highway. However, the Defendant's argument is flawed 
because the argument misinterprets how Idaho courts have determined what is or is not fair 
notice for an "as applied challenge" to I.C. § 49-808. The issue in both cases turned on the 
adequacy of the road signs. The Burton court stated: 
" . .. Dewbre is factually distinguishable [from Burton] because in 
Dewbre, road signs and arrows on the roadway informed motorists 
that the right-hand land was ending and that the traffic must merge 
into the surviving, left-hand land. In the present case [Burton], 
there is no evidence of such signage or other indicator that one lane 
is ending and the other is surviving." 
Id. State's Exhibits 1-7 show the road signs and configuration of the highway indicting that a 
tum was approaching. Most importantly, the traffic control signal with a right green arrow 
provides more than adequate notice that a turn is required at the four-way intersection. The 
adequate notice of the turn, coupled with the highway designation change necessarily results in 
the Defendant turning onto a highway. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the magistrate court's ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION TO SUPRESS and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Dated this 16th day of February, 2016. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
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Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
- COURTMINUTES -
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: February 29, 2016 · 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellate, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
IVAN DRAKE PETTIT, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
) 
Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
Recording: Z: 3/2016-02-29 
Time: 9:32 A.M. 
Case Nos. CV-2015-1389 & CR2015-1408 
Appearances: 
Keith Scholl, intern, and 
Ashley Jennings, Deputy Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 
Defendant present with counsel, 
Deborah McCormick, Public Defender 
Subject of Proceedings: APPELLATE ARGUMENT 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for the hearing of 
appellate argument in these cases, Court noted the presence of counsel and the 
defendant. 
Mr. Scholl presented argument on behalf of the appellant. Ms. McCormick 
presented argument on behalf of the respondent. No rebuttal argument. 
Court took this matter under advisement, informing counsel that in due course 
it would render a written opinion. 
Court recessed at 10:04 A.M. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES 
APPROVED BY: 
.-----·· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
NAN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_________________ ) 
Case No. CR-2015-1389 & 
Case No. CR-2015-1408 
APPELLATE OPINION 
· This is an appeal brought by the State of Idaho ("State"), Plaintiff/Appellant. 
1'he State contends the Magistrate Judge erred in granting two motions to suppress 
brought by Ivan Drake Pettit ("Pettit"), Defendant/Respondent, in Latah County 
Case Nos. CR-2015-1389, which charged Pettit with Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol (Second Offense) and CR-2015-1408, which charged Pettit with Driving 
Without Priyileges. 
BACKGROUND 
In the early morning hours of May 20, 2015, Idaho State Police Sergeant 
Clint A. Baldwin ("Baldwin") stopped the car Pettit was driving for failing to use his 
right turn signal while traveling along U.S. Highway 95 South ("Highway 95") in 
Moscow, Idaho. (Appellant's Br., p. 3.) In addition to being designated Highway 95, 
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the roadway Pettit was traveling on, at least for some time, is also designated State 
Highway 8 and South Jackson Street.I (Defendant's Ex. A; Respondent's Br., p. 4; 
Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 20:14-22.) 
Pettit was traveling southbound in the center of three lanes when he 
approached a green arrow traffic signal that indicated it was appropriate for him to 
continue on Highway 95 and to curve right. (Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 15:4-11; 
19:25; 20:1-7.) (There is also an arrow for the far right lane. The arrows on the 
center lane and far right lane are either green, indicating it is appropriate to 
continue and to curve to the right, or red, indicating the vehicle must stop before 
proceeding.) The far right lane and the center lane, in which Pettit was traveling, 
curve right in what is commonly referred to as a couplet and continue on Highway 
95. (State's Ex. 5.) The far left lane of the roadway continues straight on State 
Highway 8. (State's Ex. 2; State's Ex. 7.) A motorist can also turn left from the far 
left lane and turn on to Highway 95 and Highway 8 headed north. (State's Ex. 5.) 
Pettit remained in the center lane oft;ravel and, without signaling right, rounded 
the bend in Highway 95 while the right green arrow was displayed. (Tr. on 
Su,ppression Hr'g at 15:4-11.) 
Because Pettit did not use his right-turn signal before rounding the bend in 
conformity with the green arrow traffic signal, Baldwin pulled Pettit over. (Tr. of 
1 The South Jackson Street designation for:the roadway apparently drops off at_ some unspecified point 
At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Baldwin described the area of roadway at issue as the "Highway 
Eight/Highway Ninety-five intersection," not as the South Jackson Street/Highway Ninety-five 
intersection. See Tr. of Suppression Hr' g at 15:4-11; 16:4-8; 17:17-25; 18:1-2; 19:5-8; 19:13-17. Additionally, 
there is no indication from any of the Exhibits admitted at the Suppression Hearing that the portion of the 
roadway at issue was still designated South Jackson Street in addition to Highway 8 and Highway 95. See 
State's Ex. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; Defendant's Ex. A and B. 
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Suppression Hr'g at 21:1-8.) It is undisputed that the only reason for Baldwin's 
stop of Pettit was Pettit's failure to use his right-turn signal. (Tr. of Suppression 
Hr'g at 23:16-25; 24:1-2.) 
Baldwin eventually charged Pettit with Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol- (Second Offense) in Case No. CR-2015-1389 and Driving without 
Privileges in Case No. CR-2015-1408. Pettit pleaded not guilty to both charges and 
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the purportedly unlawful traffic stop. 
Pettit contended that a turn signal was not required and therefor the officer did not 
have reasonable suspicion to stop him. Pettit argued that the evidence obtained 
should be suppressed. On October 15, 2015, Magistrate Judge John C. Judge heard 
oral argument on Pettit's motions in the two cases. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Magistrate orally stated his findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
granted Pettit's motions to suppress. An Order Granting Motion to Suppress in 
both cases was signed by the judge on October 16, 2015. The State filed a Notice of 
Appeal in both cases on October 21, 2015. 
Oral argument on the State's appeal was heard on February 29, 2016. Keith 
P. Scholl, legal intern for the Latah County Prosecutor's Office, appeared and 
argued on behalf of the State. Ashley S. Jennings, Scholl's supervising attorney, 
was also present. Deborah L. McCormick appeared and argued on behalf of Pettit. 
Pettit was also present. 
The State raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the Magistrate 
Judge erred in holding that Baldwin did not have reasonable suspicion to believe 
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Pettit violated LC. § 49-808(1); (2) whether the Magistrate Judge erred in holding 
that LC. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pettit's traffic 
maneuver; and (3) whether the Magistrate Judge erred in holding that any 
potential mistake of law by Baldwin was not objectively reasonable. (Appellant's 
Br., p. 4.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, an appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to 
the facts as found. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct. 
App. 2010). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which an 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865, 264 P.3d 
970, 972 (2011). Additionally, where a statute's constitutionality is challenged, a 
trial court's ruling is reviewed de novo since it involves purely a question of law. 
State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Did the Magistrate Judge err in holding that Bald win did not 
have reasonable suspicion to believe Pettit violated I.C. § 49-
808(1)? 
A traffic stop conducted by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure of 
the vehicle's occupants which implicates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of 
freedom from unreasonable seizures, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 
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1996). A traffic stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment protections so long as it 
is "supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws." Id. (citation omitted). The reasonableness of the 
suspicion is evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. 
Id. Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause, but more than 
speculation or instinct on the part of an officer. Id. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Pettit' s failure to signal a right turn 
before curving right in conformity with a green traffic signal on Highway 95 formed 
Baldwin's basis for believing Pettit violated a traffic law and for his effectuating the 
traffic stop. (Probable Cause Aff. in Supp. of Arrest, p.3; Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 
21:1-8.) Consequently, the question of whether Baldwin had reasonable suspicion 
to stop Pettit turns on the application of LC. § 49-808(1) to the facts of this case. 
That statute reads, 
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right 
or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless 
and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor 
without giving an appropriate signal. 
LC. § 49-808(1). 
The State contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Baldwin 
lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Pettit was driving in violation of LC.§ 49-
808(1). (Appellant's Br., p. 4-5.) The State argues Pettit violated LC.§ 49-808(1) 
· because he was turning onto a highway and failed to use the appropriate signal. 
(Appellant's Br., p. 6.) As a result, the State contends that Baldwin had reasonable 
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suspicion to believe Pettit violated LC. § 49-808(1) and could therefore stop him. 
(Appellant's Br., p. 4.) 
Pettit counters that Baldwin lacked requisite suspicion to stop his vehicle. 
(Respt's Br., p. 5.) Pettit contends that LC.§ 49-808(1) does not require a driver to 
employ a traffic signal when rounding a bend in a roadway upon which he is 
already traveling, even if doing so with an illuminated green arrow. Id. at 6-7. 
Based on the law and evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the 
trial judge made the following findings, 
I think this really kind of comes down to an interpretation of the 
statute. And forty-nine-eight o eight, one, says no person shall turn a 
vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a highway 
or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement 
can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate 
signal. And based on my interpretation of the evidence, uh-, Mr. Pettit 
was in the middle lane, there was nowhere else for him to go. All he 
had to do was maintain that lane. All-the only direction-and this 
was-and looking at all the signs, the only direction he could go was 
around the bend of that curve. He had no other options. He was not 
moving right or left on the highway. He- he was not- he was not uh 
turning onto a new highway, because if you look at Exhibit B, it's 
Ninety-five all the way to North Main, Jackson, uh, south onto the 
highway. It's just continues [sic]. It's continuous. So he's not turning 
onto another highway. · 
Uhm, I don't think the statute's ambiguous .... And I don't 
think that construction of this statute requires hard interpretive work. 
I think it's - - it's clear on its face. And the Idaho decisions tell us that 
we have to apply the plain language of the statute. And the plain 
language of the statute doesn't require Mr. Pettit to signal in this case. 
(Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 66:25; 67:1-20; 68:20-25.) 
· The trial court went on to conclude that Baldwin's application of LC.§ 18-49--
808(1) to the facts of this case was unreasonable, that the stop was not supported by 
APPELLATE OPINION -6- 000136 
reasonable suspicion, and that all the evidence obtained as a result of the stop 
should be suppressed. (Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 70:14-20.) 
The trial judge's factual determinations are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. The magistrate made the following findings of fact: (1) Pettit 
was traveling in the center lane on Highway 95, (2) Pettit maintained his lane of 
travel, (3) Pettit went around a bend in Highway 95, (4) Pettit had nowhere to go 
but around the bend in the Highway, and (5) Pettit was not turning onto a highway. 
(Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 66:25; 67:1-19.) The evidence in the record shows that 
Pettit was traveling southbound on Highway 95 in the center lane. (Tr. of 
Suppression Hr'g at 15:4-11.) With a green traffic arrow illuminated, Pettit 
rounded a bend in Highway 95 and continued on that same highway. (Tr. of 
Suppression Hr'g at 19:25; 20:1-7.) Pettit never left the roadway designated as 
Highway 95. (Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 15:4-11; 20:14-22; see also Defendant's Ex. 
A.) Nor did Pettit have any other option but to curve right on Highway 95 while 
traveling in the center lane. (See State's Exs. 3, 4, 7.) Because the trial court's 
factual findings are supported by substantial and cqmpetent evidence, they are 
affirmed by this Court 
This Court exercises free review over the construction of I. C. § 49-808(1) and 
over its application to the facts as found by the trial-court: State v. Dewbre, 133 
Idaho 663, 665,- 991 P.2d 388, 390 (Ct. App. 1999). This Court ~mploys the following 
principles when interpreting a statute: 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins 
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with the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read 
in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire 
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words 
should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be 
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of 
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When 
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not 
consider rules of statutory construction. 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866,264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011). Here, the trial judge 
determined that LC. § 49-808(1) is unambiguous. (See Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 
67:20; 68:20-25.) A motorist must use an appropriate signal when turning his 
vehicle onto a highway, moving his vehicle right or left upon a highway, or merging 
his vehicle onto or exiting his vehicle from a highway. LC.§ 49-808(1). 
This Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge that LC.§ 49-808(1) is 
unambiguous. As a result, this Court must apply the plain language of the statute 
to the facts of this case, as found by the Magistrate, in order to determine if 
Baldwin had reasonable and articulable suspicion· to believe that Pettit was driving 
contrary to a traffic law. 
The State's argument that Pettit was "turning into an intersection from one 
highway onto another highway," and therefore, was "turning onto a highway"2 is 
unpersuasive.3 (Appellant's Br., p. 6.) As the Magistrate Judge found, Pettit was on 
2 At the suppression hearing, the State conceded that Pettit was not moving his vehicle right or left upon 
Highway 95. Tr. of Suppression Hr' g at 39:18-25; 40:1-5. On appeal, the State has not raised the issue of 
. whether Pettit was merging onto a highway, but instead only argues that "I.C. § 49-808 applies under 
these circumstances because the Defendant was turning onto a highway." Appellant's Br., p. 6. _ 
3 The State cites I.C. § 49-802(1)(b) and LC.§ 49-110(10)(a) in support of its argument that Pettit was 
required to signal right before turning right while a.green right arrow traffic signal was displayed. LC.§ 
49-802(1)(b) states that "[a] driver facing a green arrow signal, shown alone or in combination with 
another indication, shall enter the intersection only to make the movement indicated by the green arrow, 
or other movement that is permitted by other indications shown at the same time." LC. § 49-110(10)(a) 
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Highway 95 and rounded a bend in the roadway in order to continue on Highway 
95. (See Defendant's Ex. A; State's Exs. 3, 4, and 7.) Pettit did not "turn [his] 
vehicle onto a highway" because he was already traveling on Highway 95. (Tr. of 
Suppression Hr'g at 15:4-11; 20:14-22.) Defendant's Exhibit A, admitted at the 
suppression hearing, shows that at all relevant times the roadway Pettit was 
traveling on is designated Highway 95. In fact, Pettit had no option but to continue 
on Highway 95 because the center lane of travel, in which Pettit was driving, only 
defines intersection as "[t]he area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb 
lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two (2) highways which join one another 
at, or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at 
any other angle may come into confl.ict." (emphasis added.) The State contends that because Pettit was 
facing a right green arrow he was necessarily entering an intersection. (Appellanfs Br., p. 6.) According 
to the State, because Pettit was in an intersection when he curved right on Highway 95, he was "turning 
onto a highway," and therefore, a turn signal was required per LC. § 49-808(1). Id. However, as an initial 
matter, neither LC.§ 49-802(1)(b) nor LC.§ 49-llO(lO)(a) contain language requiring that a driver in an 
intersection or a driver facing a green arrow use a turn signal. LC.§ 49-llO(lO)(a) merely defines 
intersection, and LC. § 49-802(1)(b) merely states that a driver facing a green arrow signal shall only enter 
an intersection to make the movement indicated ,by the green arrow. If the legislature had wanted to 
require a turn signal when encountering a green arrow, it could have easily done so. The fact that it did 
not suggests one is unnecessary. See State v. Schulz,151 Idaho 863,866,264 P.3d 970,973-(2011). LC.§ 49-
808(1) is the statute that governs turning movements and required signals in Idaho. State v. Brooks, 157 
Idaho 890,892,341 P.3d 1259, 1261 (Ct. App. 2014), review denied (Feb. 9, 2015). Consequently, a driver 
is only required to signal if he is turning onto a highway or moving right or left upon a highway or 
merging onto or exiting from a highway. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that LC.§ 49-802(1)(b) and LC.§ 49-llO(lO)(a) impose an 
obligation upon a driver to signal independent of I.C. § 49-808(1), Pettit's failure to signal right did not 
run afoul of either provision. Pettit did, in fact, make the movement indicated by the green arrow he 
was facing, that is, he curved right on Highway 95. However, Pettit was not in an intersection as defined 
by LC. § 49-llO(lO)(a) when he curved right because he was not within an area where two highways join 
one another a~ right angles, nor was he within an area where vehicles traveling upon different highways 
]oining at any other angle J11ay come into conflict. See State's Ex~ 7'. Pettit_ was on Highway 95. Pettit did 
not leave Highway 95 at any point during his "right turn," nor did Pettit' s path of travel ever intersect 
with another highway. See Defendant's Ex. A; State's Ex. 3. Highway 95 simply cannot intersect with 
·-·•· itself foform an intersection as the term is defined in J.C. § 49-808(1) because an intersection only occurs 
- where two highways or different highways cross paths. Had Pettit been traveling in the far left hand lane 
and continued straight on Highway 8, he would have been within the intersection of Highway 8 and 
Highway 95 North. See Defendant's Ex. A; State's Ex. 6. Similarly, had Pettit been traveling west bound 
on Highway 8 and turned left or right onto Highway 95 he would have been within an intersection of two 
highways. See Defendanf s Ex. A. However, Pettit was traveling on Highway 95 and rounded a bend in 
the roadway, which did not cross paths with Highway 8 or any other highway, to continue on Highway 
95. As a result, Pettit was not within an intersection as defined by J.C. § 49-llO(lO)(a). 
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allows a driver to round the bend in the Highway and continue on that Highway. 
(State's Ex. 7.) In applying LC. § 49-808(1) to the facts of Pettit's case, the 
Magistrate Judge correctly and reasonably concluded that Pettit was not required 
to signal right before rounding the bend in the roadway and therefore, that 
Baldwin's stop of Pettit was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
Moreover, case law reveals the intent of the legislature as expressed through 
the plain language of the statute: 
The first subsection [J.C. § 49-808(1)] provides that "no person shall 
turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a 
highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the 
movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an 
appropriate signal." (emphasis added.) The first sentence of subsection 
two further provides that "a signal of intention to turn or move right or 
left when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic." 
(emphasis added.) These provisions discl~se a clear legislative intent 
to promote reasonable safety on the roadways by requiring an 
appropriate signal for the circumstances to give sufficient notice to 
warn other traffic that a driver intends to turn or make a lateral 
movement on the roadway. 
State u. Brooks, 157 Idaho 890, 894, 341 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Ct. App. 2014). 
In this instance, the use of a right turn signal would not aid in promoting 
safety on the roadways. A vehicle traveling in the far right lane or the center lane 
of Highway 95 has no option but to curve right and continue on Highway 95. (See 
State's Ex. 7.) This is made clear by tl;ie posted traffic signs, the painted arrows in 
. . - : . . . -···· ----. ·..... ·- -
the roadway, and the green_arrow traffic signals. (See State's Ex ... 3 and 7.) 
.· . . -
Additionally,the two lane·softravel that curve right do not intersect with any other--
lanes of travel. Id. Consequently, a driver following behind a vehicle traveling in 
the center lane or right hand lane knows the vehicle ahead will be curving right and 
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continuing on Highway 95. Additionally, there are no direct oncoming vehicles that 
need to be notified as to what a d6ver in the center lane or right hand lane intend 
to do. 
If vehicles traveling along Highway 95 in the center lane, like Pettit's, were 
required to signal right before rounding the bend in the roadway, drivers following 
behind could be confused by the use of the signal. Pursuant to LC. § 49-808(2) a 
driver traveling in the center who wishes to change his lane of travel to the right 
hand lane is required to signal right for 5 seconds or 100 feet prior to changing 
lanes. Consequently, if a driver traveling in the center lane was also required to 
signal right before rounding the bend in the roadway, other drivers could be 
confused regarding the driver's intention. 
The trial court correctly determined that Baldwin did not have reasonable 
and articulable suspicion to believe that Pettit was driving in violation of LC. § 49-
808(1). T~e language of LC. § 49-808(1) is unambiguous. A signal is only required 
where a vehicle is being turned onto a highway, moved right or left upon a highway, 
or merging onto or exiting from a highway. LC.§ 49-808(1). Pettit was not 
performing any of these traffic maneuvers when he curved right on Highway 95. 
Consequently, Pettit did nothing to run afoul of I.C. § 49-808(1). The Magistrate's 
determination that Bald:win lacked reasonable.suspicion to believe that Pettit 
violatedI.C. § 49-808(1) is supported by the Magistrate's factual findings and this 
Court's de novo determination of the law - as it applies to those facts. 
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·.~~ ·. 
B. Did the Magistrate Judge err in holding that LC.§ 49-808(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pettit's traffic maneuver? 
When an appellate court considers a claim involving the constitutionality of a 
statute, it reviews the trial court's ruling de nova since it involves purely a question 
of law. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197, 969 P.2d at 246 (1998). 
"The void for vagueness doctrine is an aspect of due process requiring that 
the meaning of a criminal statute be determinable." Id. "A statute is void for 
vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Id. "A statute should not be held void for [vagueness] if any practical 
interpretation can be given it." Id. There is a strong presumption that a statute is 
constitutional, and an appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a 
statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id. 
A -statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its 
face or as applied to a defendant's conduct; To succeed on an "as 
applied" vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that the 
statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair 
notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide 
sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in 
determining whether to arrest him. 
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 35, 218 P.3d 10, 14 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). 
Here, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that, 
[T]lie:plain.language of[I.C. § 49-808(1)] doesn't require Mr. Pettit to 
:,: __ :.c}signal inthis:e_ase;··Now, if I'm wrorigaboutthat; thenl dothiri.k itis--. 
:·.'.::':Unc6ristitutioriallyvague as applied to Mr. Pettit, because I don't think 
: ·that statute - - uh, when you're just simply maintaining your lane in a 
bend in the ro~d, following the same highway, I don't think that 
statute makes it clear to the ord- - a person of ordinary intelligence, 
that that person needs to signal to take that bend in the road .... So 
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I'm applying my common sense ... to this situation to suggest uh that 
uh, number one, Mr. Pettit did not need to com - - did not need to 
signal in that circumstance. Number two, uh, that at best it was uh 
vague, unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Pettit in that 
circumstance. 
(Tr. of Suppression Hr'g at 68:24-25; 69:1-8; 70:8-13.) The State argues that the 
Magistrate's decision regarding the constitutionality of the statute as applied to 
Pettit was erroneous. (Appellant's Br., p. 8.) 
"It is well established that when a case can be decided upon a ground other 
than a constitutional ground, [an appellate court] will not address the constitutional 
issue unless it is necessary for a determination of the case." Mullinix v. Killgore's 
Salmon River Fruit Co., 158 Idaho 269, 279, 346 P.3d 286, 296 (2015) (citation 
omitted). Here, it is unnecessary to address the application of the void for vagueness 
doctrine because this Court has resolved this case on other grounds as discussed 
above. 
C. Whether the Magistrate Judge erred in holding that any potential 
mistake of law by Baldwin was not objectively reasonable? 
An objectively reasonable mistake of fact will sometimes operate to forgive or 
validate a Fourth Amendment violation. State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 303, 246 
P.3d 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2010). In Idaho, the question of whether an officer's 
. mistake of law is unreasonable per se or should be treated like a mistake of fact for 
·:purposes oftheFourth Amendment has never been determined. Id. However, in·· -
:. Flei~nv .. NortHCarolina;the United States Supreme C0urt held that an officer's·. 
reasonable mistake of law could form the basis for the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to uphold a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 135 S. Ct. 530, 536, 
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190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (U.S. 2014). There, Heien was a passenger in a vehicle that was 
stopped because the vehicle's right brake light was not operating properly. Id. at 
534. The relevant North Carolina statute, which had never been interpreted, 
required vehicles to be "equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle" and 
stated that "the stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other 
rear lamps." Id. at 535. Ultimately, the law was interpreted as only requiring one 
stop lamp, which rendered the officer's belief that the statute required two working 
brake lights to be a mistake of law. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the 
officer's error of law was reasonable based on the language of the statute that 
referred to "rear lamps," and the fact that the "stop lamp" provision had nev.er been 
construed by a North Carolina appellate court. Id. at 540. 
In Justice Kagan's concurring opinion in Heien, she pointed out that an 
officer only makes a reasonable mistake of law if the statute at issue is "genuinely 
ambiguous such that overturning the officer's judgment requires hard interpretive 
work." Id. at 541. Justice Kagan also made clear that such cases will be exceedingly 
rare. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
Here, as discussed above, LC.§ 49-808(1) is unambiguous. The plain 
language of the statute makes clear that an appropriate signal is required when a 
vehicle is turned onto a highway or moved right or left upon a highway or merged 
onto or exited from a highway. Baldwin's belief that LC.§ 49-808(1) required a turn 
signal when a vehicle is rounding a bend in one continuous highway is not a 
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reasonable mistake oflaw. The Magistrate Judge's determination in this respect 
will therefore be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate's decision to suppress the evidence in these two cases is 
AFFIRMED. The cases are REMANDED to the Magistrate Division for further 
proceedings. },-
Dated thisJ.L day of March 2016. 
APPELLATE OPINION 
Join R. Stegner 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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) 
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) 
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) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
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REMITTITUR 
TO: SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, MAGISTRATE DIVISION, 
COUNTY OF LATAH. 
The Court's Appellate Opinion in this case was filed on April 1, 2016, and has 
now become final in accordance with I.A.R. 38; therefore, 
It is ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Magistrate Division of 
the Latah County District Court for further proceedings consistent with the 
Appellate Opinion filed on April 1, 2016. 
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Dated this _~_>/_ day of April 2016. 
District Judge 
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Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
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CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
LATAH COUNTY 
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Deputy Attorney General 
Chief. Criminal Law Division 9Y ____ ...,Q_._;....,, _______ DEPUTY 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Idaho State Bar #4051 
Deputy Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR LATAH COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
IVAN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) District Court Case No. 
) CR~2015-1389 
) 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
TO: IVAN DRAKE PETTIT, THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, 
DEBORAH L McCORMICK, McCORMICK LAW OFFICE, P.O. BOX 10005, 
MOSCOW, IDAHO 83843 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the 
above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the APPELLATE 
OPINION, entered in the above..:.entitled action on the 1st day of April, 2016, the 
Honorable John R. Stegner presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 1 
000150 
I'll/\\/ / 2 ,', < / " " .. "'/' , H r l··i · ' 1 ,., , ... 11 -· '' , r, , , \' 1..1 ../ , J '~ , YI ,~ ATTY GEN - CRIM DIV NO. 596 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable 
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11(c)(10), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district 
court erred in affirming the magistrate's suppression order. 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been 
sealed. 
5. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript: 
No additional transcript is requested. The state requests that the 
transcript of proceedings in the magistrate division prepared for the appeal to the 
district court be included in the record as an exhibit. 
6. Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, 
I.A.R. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the 
address set out below: 
SHERYL L. ENGLER 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(b) That arrangements have been made with the Latah County 
Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's 
transcript; 
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(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee 
for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant 
(Idaho Code§ 31-3212); 
(d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in 
a criminal case (I.AR. 23(a)(8)); 
(e) That service is being made upon all parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, I.AR. 
DATED this 6th day of May, 2016. 
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DEBORAH L. McCORMICK 
McCormick Law Office 
P.O. Box 10005 
Moscow, ID 83843 
SHERYL L ENGLER 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
HAND DELIVERY 
STEPHEN W. KENYON 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
KKJ/dd 
KENNETH K. JORGEN 
Deputy Attorney Genera 
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) District Court Case Nos. 
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__ ,--____________ ) 
TO: !VAN DRAKE PETTIT, THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, 
DEBORAH L. McCORMICK, McCORMICK LAW OFFICE, P.O. BOX 10005, 
MOSCOW, IDAHO 83843 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT: 
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1. . The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the 
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Honorable John R. Stegner presiding. 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable 
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11(c)(10), I.AR. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district 
court erred in affirming the magistrate's suppression order. 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record (except the PSI) 
has been sealed. 
5. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript: 
No additional transcript is requested. The state requests that the 
transcript of proceedings in the magistrate division prepared for the appeal to the 
district court be included in the record as an exhibit. 
6. Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, 
I.AR. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the 
address set out below: 
SHERYL L ENGLER 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(b) That arrangements have been made with the Latah County 
Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's 
transcript; 
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(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee 
for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appeHant 
(Idaho Code§ 31-3212); 
(d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in 
a criminal case (I.AR. 23(a)(8)); 
(e) That service is being made upon all parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, I.AR. 
DATED this 6th day of May, 2016. 
KENNETH K. JORG 
Deputy Attorney Gen ral 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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STATE OF IDAHO, CLEnl·~?r,.g1;::~J:}1 yuu).11 
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Plaintiff-Appellant, ,:,-; --- · · .\ ···· ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
ORDER TO CON SOLID A TE APPEAL 
NOS. 44198 AND 44199 FOR ALL 
PURPOSES 
Supreme Court Docket No. 44198-2016 
Latah County No. CR-2015-1389 
Supreme Court Docket No. 44199-2016 
Latah County No. CR-2015-1408 
WHEREAS, it appearing that the above entitled appeals should be CONSOLIDATED FOR 
ALL PURPOSES; therefore, 
IT HEREBY lS ORDERED that appeal Nos. 44198 and 44199 shall be CONSOLIDATED 
FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 44198, and all documents filed thereafter shall bear both docket 
numbers. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S 
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in each of these Notices of Appeal, 
together with a copy of this Order. This CLERK'S RECORD shall be filed with this Court after 
settlement occurs. rl/::i 
cc: 
DATED this~ day of May, 2016. 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge John R. Stegner 
·- ..... 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court Case Nos. 44198 & 44199 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
_________ ) 
I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing transcript in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full, complete and correct transcript of the pleadings 
and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above entitled cause 
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the court reporter's 
transcript and the clerk's record, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Moscow, Idaho this£ day of..l/1 l . 1+lf d}. 2016. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
Henrianne K. Westberg, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
By 2, C&JJ-ULiu.-= 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
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) 
_________ ) 
Supreme Court NoS. 44198 & 44199 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
RE: EXHIBITS 
I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the 
following EXHIBITS: 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON OCTOBER 15, 2015 
STATE'S EXHIBITS: 
#1 Photograph, intersection, far away - Admitted 
#2 Photograph, close up of sign (7 signs)-Admitted 
#3 Photograph, close up of left turn arrow - Admitted 
#4 Photograph, close up of sign (6 signs)-Admitted 
#5 Photograph, red lights - Admitted 
#6 Photograph, yellow lights - Admitted 
#7 Photograph, green lights - Admitted 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS: 
# A Google Earth Map - Admitted 
#B Google Earth Map-Admitted 
AND FURTHER that the transcript of the Suppression Hearing held on October 15, 2015, 
will be lodged as exhibits as provided by Rule 31(a)(3), IAR. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXIIlBITS - 1 
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IN WITNESS WHEREJ>F; J have he;?Jinto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at Moscow, Idaho thisoL_,7_ day of 1LL<....= , 2016. 
Henrianne K. Westberg, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
By ~ · Um 1 J-e.J)k 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. 
IV AN DRAKE PETTIT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
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) 
_________ ) 
Supreme Court Nos. 44198 & 44199 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by United 
States mail, one copy of the Reporter's Transcripts and Clerk's Record to each of the attorneys of 
record in this cause as follows: 
DEB MCCORMICK 
MCCORMICK LAW OFFICE 
POBOX10005 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPU1Y ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POBOX83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
IN WITNESS/J~EOF, t:e hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Moscow, Idaho thi~ay of Uj\ o 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Henrianne K. Westberg, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
By ~ -LR~  
Deputy Clerk 
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